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Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the
Path of Precedent
Randy J. Kozel*
Constitutional precedents give rise to a jurisprudential tug-of-war. On one
side is the value of adhering to precedent and allowing the law to remain settled.
On the other side is the value of departing from precedent and allowing the law
to improve. In this Article, I contend that negotiating the tension depends on
bridging the divide between constitutional precedent and interpretive method.
My aim is to analyze the ways in which theories of precedent are, and are
not, derivative of overarching methods of constitutional interpretation. I seek to
demonstrate that although certain consequences of deviating from precedent can
be studied in isolation, the ultimate choice between overruling and retaining a
past decision requires the integration of a broader interpretive method.
Moreover, because a single interpretive philosophy may be derived from varying
normative baselines, constitutional lawyers must press beyond the threshold
election of competing methodological schools to engage with the schools’
respective foundations. Whether one’s preferred approach is originalism, living
constitutionalism, or otherwise, the importance of implementing a given
constitutional rule depends on methodological commitments and the normative
premises that inform them.
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Introduction
Text is what starts the engine of constitutional law, but precedent is
what really makes it hum.1 Legal briefs and judicial opinions are awash in
efforts to marshal, characterize, and distinguish prior decisions. Even novel
arguments are consistently framed to suggest that what seems like a break
from the past is actually an enhancement of continuity.2

1. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 33–36 (2010) (emphasizing the
importance of precedent to constitutional adjudication); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent
in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 139 (1991) (“The gloss
added to the Constitution in the form of precedents is an integral part of most dialogues among the
Justices about the Constitution.”).
2. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362–63 (2010) (“Our precedent is to be
respected unless the most convincing of reasons demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a
course that is sure error.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574–75 (2005) (declining to follow a
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The pervasiveness of precedent is equaled by the controversy it can
engender. In its most robust form, the invocation of precedent can lead a
court to issue rulings that run counter to what its decision would otherwise
be. It is little wonder that the Supreme Court’s approach to precedent—often
referred to by the Latinate shorthand, stare decisis3—drips with political
valence and serves as a flashpoint during the vetting of every would-be
Justice.4
The prevailing wisdom among Supreme Court Justices and academic
commentators alike is that precedent has a critical role to play in shaping the
trajectory of constitutional law.5 Yet disagreement abounds over how to
develop a theory of precedent that lends itself to principled application.
Within the American legal system, no constitutional precedent is beyond
judicial revocability, and the Supreme Court occasionally overrules its past
decisions.6 At other times, however, the existence of an applicable precedent
leads the Justices to embrace a constitutional interpretation despite
reservations about its soundness.7 Justice Brandeis famously described the
overarching tension as between the law’s being “settled” and its being
“settled right,”8 though it is perhaps more illuminating to restate the
dichotomy in terms of “settled and wrong” versus “unsettled and right.”
Some eight decades after Justice Brandeis’s diagnosis of the problem, the
solution continues to prove elusive. As Randy Barnett recently noted,

precedent based in part on the view that the precedent was inconsistent with cases that came before
and after it); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (asserting in the course of overruling
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), that the “foundations” of Bowers had already “sustained
serious erosion” from more recent decisions).
3. The complete phrase is “stare decisis et non quieta movere—stand by the thing decided and
do not disturb the calm.” James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a
Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REV. 345, 347 (1986).
4. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda
v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 30 (2010) (“[I]n their confirmation hearings both then-Judge Roberts
and then-Judge Alito gave assurances about adherence to stare decisis.”); Lawrence B. Solum, The
Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of
Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 156 (2006) (“In the Warren Court era, the
political, judicial, and academic left seemed to view constitutional stare decisis as the enemy of
progressive (living constitution) constitutionalism. In the Roberts Court era, stare decisis may be
the last defense of Warren Court precedents against conservative (originalist) constitutionalism on
the ascendancy.”).
5. Though it is widely accepted as valid, the doctrine of stare decisis has attracted a handful of
prominent opponents in the context of constitutional law. See infra section III(A)(1).
6. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 & n.1 (1991) (discussing the Court’s record
of overruling its constitutional decisions).
7. E.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 359–60 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in part);
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861 (1992);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 571 (2001).
8. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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“[h]ow and when precedent should be rejected remains one of the great
unresolved controversies of jurisprudence.”9
My initial goal in this Article is to link the conceptual ambiguity that
surrounds theories of precedent to their estrangement from interpretive
method. Judicial opinions and scholarly commentary have yielded welltheorized accounts of certain consequences of departing from precedent,
including the disruption of settled expectations. But even an exhaustive
analysis of those effects would be inadequate because they deal only with the
importance of leaving the law settled. Before determining whether to retain
or reject a flawed precedent, there must also be an inquiry into the
importance of getting the law right—in other words, of replacing one
constitutional rule with another.10 Conducting that latter assessment is
enmeshed with the process of selecting a method of constitutional
interpretation.
Precedents are neither good nor bad; it is interpretive method that makes
them so.11 The urgency of rectifying a misapplication of the law will look
very different as between an originalist who takes her touchstone as the
Constitution’s original public meaning and a living constitutionalist who
accepts the primacy of contemporary understandings and mores. Further,
multiple perspectives commonly emerge within interpretive schools as the
result of varying normative premises. For example, some proponents of
originalism defend that approach on consequentialist grounds, while others
describe it as reflecting the role of popular sovereignty in legitimating
judicial review.12
Their respective normative premises lead the
consequentialist and popular-sovereigntist strands of originalism to adopt
divergent views regarding the severity of constitutional errors. The
phenomenon is not unique to originalism; it applies across constitutional

9. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 261 (2005).
10. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (noting the importance of assessing “the respective costs of
reaffirming and overruling a prior case”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 378 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (“When considering whether to reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we must balance
the importance of having constitutional questions decided against the importance of having them
decided right.”); John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) (“To
overturn a decision settling one such matter simply because we might believe that decision is no
longer ‘right’ would inevitably reflect a willingness to reconsider others.”).
11. Cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act 2, sc. 2
(E.K. Chambers ed., D.C. Heath & Co. 1917) (1603) (“[T]here is nothing either good or bad, but
thinking makes it so . . . .”).
12. Compare John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and
Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 804–05 (2009) (adopting a consequentialist approach to
originalism), with Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93
VA. L. REV. 1437, 1446–47 (2007) (adopting an approach to originalism based on popular
sovereignty).
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theories. The perceived benefit of deviating from precedent is always
derivative of one’s interpretive method and normative priors.13
This recognition can be useful in organizing the various ramifications of
precedent according to their relationship with interpretive philosophy.
Considerations such as the disruptiveness of overruling a settled rule are
independent of constitutional method. They are amenable to meaningful
discussion outside the context of any particular interpretive philosophy,
though interpretive philosophy will determine their relevance in the final
calculus of whether to overrule. By contrast, the direct harms caused by the
ongoing retention of a flawed precedent are dependent effects; they generate
their content only upon being situated within a broader interpretive
framework.
If one believes that the First Amendment prohibits
discrimination against corporate speakers, one’s theory of precedent requires
an apparatus for gauging how harmful it would be to retain the contrary
rule.14 So, too, if one believes that the Constitution protects a right of
intimate conduct between people of the same gender,15 that it lacks any right
to nontherapeutic abortions,16 or that it forbids the utilization of raceconscious admissions in higher education.17
The determinants of
precedential durability include the relevant costs of perpetuating an
erroneous rule. How those costs are defined depends on methodological and
normative commitments.
What, then, of contemporary constitutional practice? The Supreme
Court has resisted the adoption of any unified methodology for resolving
constitutional disputes.18 The Court occasionally ascribes controlling
significance to the Constitution’s original meaning, as in its recent discussion
of the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms.19 In other cases original
meaning is a nonfactor, leaving room for theoretical, prudential, or doctrinal
considerations to move to the forefront.20 The inconsistency is partly the
product of the Court’s status as a multiparty institution whose members
13. See Lash, supra note 12, at 1439 (contending that “an ultimate theory of stare decisis
necessarily reflects the normative commitments underlying a particular interpretive approach”).
14. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
15. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986)).
16. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992) (reaffirming the “central
holding” of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
17. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (reconsidering Regents of the Univ. of
Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)).
18. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13
(1996) (noting that “[a]s an institution, the Supreme Court has not made an official choice” among
competing theories of constitutional interpretation).
19. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008) (adopting an interpretation
based on “the original understanding of the Second Amendment”).
20. See STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 33 (arguing that “original understandings play a role only
occasionally [in Supreme Court cases], and usually they are makeweights, or the Court admits that
they are inconclusive”).
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exhibit varying jurisprudential sympathies. It also reflects the skepticism of
some individual Justices toward unified theories of interpretation.21 These
institutional and individual considerations have converged to establish the
Court’s approach to constitutional interpretation as fundamentally pluralistic.
Even if one is initially inclined to accept pluralism as a valid
adjudicative approach, I am going to suggest that when viewed in light of the
Court’s doctrine of stare decisis, pluralism is problematic. Evaluating the
severity of a given constitutional mistake requires invoking a particular
interpretive method and a corresponding set of normative premises. Without
those anchors, the value of constitutional accuracy is left undefined.
Rejecting all interpretive theories in favor of pluralism undermines efforts to
compare the costs and benefits of precedential continuity because pluralism
affords no metric by which to gauge their relative importance.
This Article begins in Part I by introducing the diverse roles of
precedent in constitutional discourse. In Parts II and III, I categorize salient
implications of precedent-based adjudication based on their degree of
connection with interpretive method. Part II describes the independent
effects of precedential continuity, which are amenable to preliminary
analysis without the overlay of interpretive method. Juxtaposed against these
considerations are the dependent effects of continuity, which are discussed in
Part III. Drawing on leading movements in constitutional theory, I argue that
the dependent effects are necessarily bound up with considerations of
interpretive method. In proper operation, the foundational premises that
drive one’s approach to constitutional interpretation should exert a centripetal
force on one’s approach to precedent, causing both theories to revolve
around the same normative core.
Part IV explores the implications for constitutional adjudication at the
U.S. Supreme Court. I hope to illuminate the dissonance between
interpretive pluralism and precedent-based adjudication, a dissonance that
exposes some vulnerabilities of pluralism as an interpretive approach.
Finally, Part V addresses the objection that integrating interpretive method
with deference to precedent is intrinsically corrupting of constitutional
theory. The Part also considers potential extensions of the Article’s analysis
beyond the sphere of constitutional precedent.
Before closing this Introduction, I offer three further notes. First, for
purposes of what follows, I use the concept of an “interpretive method” to
refer to any consistent and overarching strategy for determining the meaning
of the U.S. Constitution. For example, two of the most prominent strategies
in the modern academic discourse are originalism and living
constitutionalism, both of which are discussed in the pages below. At the
broadest level, the former is characterized by a desire to effectuate the
Constitution’s original meaning, while the latter contemplates a leading role

21. See infra subpart IV(C).
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for contemporary sensibilities and policy judgments in resolving
constitutional disputes.22 The selection of those two schools of interpretation
is merely illustrative, and it raises a more general question: whether a judge
or constitutional lawyer must make a commitment to some interpretive
method in order to properly analyze the ramifications of precedent.
Second, I am using the concepts of accuracy, rightness, and error as
something like terms of art. I employ them in reference to the interpretations
that a jurist would have voted to implement in the absence of contrary
precedent. I acknowledge the argument that some revisions of the law that
are preferred by subsequent judges may reflect the empowerment of new
coalitions with new judicial philosophies more so than the identification of
genuine “error.”23 Regardless, circumstances will arise in which a judge
believes that existing precedent ought to be revised or replaced. The pivotal
question remains unchanged: When should deference to precedent dissuade a
decisionmaker from pursuing the result that she would otherwise view as
preferable? Indeed, an important part of my project is exploring the path a
judge must travel before concluding that a given constitutional ruling is
warranted despite the fact that the same ruling would be unjustified if certain
precedents were not on the books.
Third, I also acknowledge the argument that constitutional precedent is
itself constitutive of law,24 such that it is not coherent to ask what result
would have followed in the absence of controlling precedent. Even under
that approach to constitutional law, courts will regularly confront the
question of whether to depart from a line of precedent. Answering that
question requires a theory of what types of effects are legally salient—a
theory, in other words, about the normative objectives of constitutional law.
As a result, the arguments I advance about the connection between
interpretive method and stare decisis continue to apply.
I.

Precedent’s Place in Constitutional Discourse

Given the latent nuance in terms like “precedent” and “stare decisis,” it
is worthwhile to take a moment to describe the diverse functions of precedent
in modern constitutional discourse.25

22. See infra subpart III(A).
23. For a more general discussion of the potential distinction between legal change and legal
progress in the context of transition theory, see Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational
Expectations, and Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211, 239–49 (2003).
24. Cf. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001) (contending that binding judicial
authority “is not merely evidence of what the law is,” but rather “caselaw on point is the law”).
25. The topic of this Part is the variety of ways in which precedent is deployed in the context of
constitutional litigation and adjudication. Judicial precedents also have manifold consequences
beyond the courthouse doors for elected officials, administrative agencies, and the public at large.
For a thoughtful treatment of those effects, see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT
147–76 (2008).
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One function of precedent is hierarchical control.26 A court of superior
rank issues an opinion interpreting the Constitution. Thereafter, inferior
courts face a binding obligation to treat that interpretation as controlling.
The obligation persists even if an inferior-court judge views the precedent as
incorrect27 or reasonably predicts that the superior court itself is no longer
likely to follow it.28 Within American constitutional law, the rule of
hierarchical precedent—also called vertical precedent—is indefeasible and
absolute.29 As we shall see, this rigidity differs markedly from the Supreme
Court’s approach to its own, horizontal precedents.
A court’s prior decisions can also exert influence on future adjudicators
by means of persuasion: Though the later court is not required to follow the
opinion in question, it is able to study the opinion’s reasoning, thereby
benefiting from the analytical work already done by other judges. Likewise,
the later court can examine whether its predecessors’ empirical assumptions
and projections have been borne out over time. Unlike hierarchical control,
the persuasive function of precedent does not portray the mere issuance of a
precedent as carrying independent significance.30 Sooner or later, a court
that looks to precedent in a persuasive fashion must gauge the soundness of
its reasoning. As Justice Scalia has noted, “If one has been persuaded by
another, so that one’s judgment accords with the other’s, there is no room for
deferral—only for agreement.”31 The consultation of precedents for
persuasive purposes continues to be useful in helping later courts to
understand and evaluate competing arguments. Notwithstanding this utility,

26. I draw the description of lower-court constraint as representing the “hierarchical” use of
precedent from Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REV. 817, 819 (1994).
27. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1008
(2009) (“Lower court judges are frequently subject to mediated constitutional constraints, reflecting
their obligations to accept the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution even when they
believe the Court has erred.”).
28. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (“[I]t is this Court’s prerogative
alone to overrule one of its precedents.”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (“We do not
acknowledge, and we do not hold, that other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by
implication, overruled an earlier precedent.”).
29. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 4, at 188 (“When it comes to vertical stare decisis, the
conventional notion is that the decisions of higher courts are binding on lower courts. A court of
appeals may not decide to overrule a Supreme Court decision because the advantages of the better
rule outweigh the costs of changing legal rules.”). For a comparative perspective on the
bindingness of vertical precedent, see generally Santiago Legarre, Precedent in Argentine Law, 57
LOY. L. REV. 781 (2011).
30. See Frederick Schauer, Essay, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1943 (2008)
(“[I]f an agent is genuinely persuaded of some conclusion because she has come to accept the
substantive reasons offered for that conclusion by someone else, then authority has nothing to do
with it.”).
31. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1340 n.6 (2011)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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however, the persuasive function of precedent never requires a court to issue
a ruling whose substantive merit it doubts.32
What initially appears to be a persuasive invocation of precedent often
reveals itself as something different: an exercise in stage setting. In
constitutional disputes, as in other forms of litigation, judges (like the
attorneys who litigate before them) utilize precedents as a means of framing
and bolstering their arguments. The implication is not necessarily that the
reviewing court believes that it must follow the precedents. Nor is it that the
precedents warrant consideration due solely to the persuasiveness of their
reasoning. Instead, the existence of the precedents is used to suggest that the
subsequent court’s ruling represents an unremarkable application of
established principles.33 Though the prior decisions may not have spoken to
the precise question under review, they are depicted as setting the doctrinal
stage and suggesting the appropriate result by analogy or modest extension.34
Like the persuasive function of precedent, the use of precedent for stage
setting is nonconstraining. A court that describes past decisions as consistent
with its holding does not necessarily indicate that its ruling would have been
different but for the existence of precedent. To the contrary, the court might
well agree with the decisions’ rationales. Stage setting influences the
superstructure of judicial rhetoric and reason giving. It may even supply an
element of “lawyerly authenticity.”35 But it does not affect the bottom line
by requiring a judge to accept a constitutional interpretation that she
disfavors on the merits.
Between the poles of absolute constraint on the one hand and persuasion
and stage setting on the other are those functions of precedent that affect the
substance of judicial rulings without imposing an inexorable duty to reaffirm
existing law. For starters, respect for precedent can promote incrementalism
and continuity by acting as a braking mechanism that encourages judges to

32. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
23, 25 (1994) (noting the differing implications of the persuasive and self-constraining functions of
precedent).
33. See Schauer, supra note 30, at 1951 (“The author of a brief or opinion who uses support to
deny genuine novelty is asking the reader to take the supported proposition as being at least slightly
more plausible because it has been said before than had it not been.”).
34. Compare Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2590 (2012) (“Our
precedents recognize Congress’s power to regulate ‘class[es] of activities,’ not classes of
individuals, apart from any activity in which they are engaged.” (citations omitted) (quoting
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005))), with id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“Since 1937, our precedent has
recognized Congress’ large authority to set the Nation’s course in the economic and social welfare
realm.”), and id. at 2646 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“At the outer edge of the commerce power, this
Court has insisted on careful scrutiny of regulations that do not act directly on an interstate market
or its participants.”).
35. Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and
Normative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 311, 329 (2005).
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be moderate and gradual in their decisionmaking.36 The underlying theory,
which coheres with principles of common law adjudication, is that it is
generally preferable for courts to make changes at the margins and exert
pressure on the forward trajectory of the law rather than overhauling what
was previously settled.37 Respect for precedent assists in this mission by
encouraging judges to seek out plausible bases of distinguishing past
decisions instead of abandoning them outright.38
The motivation for a court’s incrementalism may be the belief, often
associated with the political philosophy of Edmund Burke, that caution is
prudent because “new departures are likely to have unanticipated adverse
consequences.”39 Alternatively, incrementalism may reflect the intuition that
change will tend to be less disruptive and controversial when it is achieved
gradually over time.40 In either case, incrementalism differs from persuasion
and stage setting through its ability to make a tangible impact on the
subsequent court’s decision. A judge who is inclined to announce a dramatic
legal change but who adopts the incrementalist mindset will be deterred by
the prospect of overruling numerous precedents. As a compromise, the judge
will articulate the appropriate rule to govern cases like the one at bar without
going further by sweeping away multiple decisions or extending the law in
revolutionary new ways.41 A commitment to incrementalism accordingly
carries the potential to affect the scope of judicial decisions. Note, however,
that incrementalism still permits the reviewing court to reach whatever result
it deems appropriate in the case at hand, even if that means overruling an
36. See Jill E. Fisch, The Implications of Transition Theory for Stare Decisis, 13 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 93, 96 (2003) (“Over a series of decisions, a precedent that is never formally
overruled may lose much of its force through incremental judicial decisionmaking.”).
37. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 403 (2011) (“Judges in the
United States . . . are embedded within a common law tradition of incremental policymaking
through the slow accretion of a body of principles, standards, and rules that we collectively call ‘the
law.’”); Robert H. Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A. J. 334, 334 (1944)
(“[S]tare decisis is an old friend of the common lawyer.”).
38. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 169 (1999) (“An originalist Court need not seek to
overturn the existing corpus of constitutional law overnight, or even over a decade. . . .
[M]odification of existing precedent can take place over a series of cases over a period of years
without unduly damaging either the judiciary or the structure of constitutional law.”).
39. Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 402 (2006); see also
Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARV. L. REV. 411, 426 (2012) (“To a Burkean, historical practice is important in part because of
its potential to reflect collective wisdom generated by the judgments of numerous actors over
time.”); Sunstein, supra, at 368 (arguing that “Burkean courts attempt a delegation of power from
individual judges to firmly rooted traditions” or to “the judiciary’s own past”).
40. Cf. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
921, 925 (1992) (describing the value of “accommodating change to the larger, essentially stable
context in which it occurs”).
41. Cf. Barry Friedman, The Will of the People and the Process of Constitutional Change, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1232, 1237 (2010) (“Each constitutional decision of the Supreme Court . . .
invariably shifts constitutional practice in some small way . . . . Most of this change is interstitial,
even glacial—the gradual working out of doctrine and principle.”).
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applicable precedent. The incrementalist mindset is a technique for
mediating change, not preventing it.
The role of precedent undergoes a metamorphosis when a court
endorses a constitutional decision whose soundness it doubts in an effort to
maintain consistency with its past self. In such a case, the court treats
precedent as self-binding: The litigated dispute would have had a different
outcome but for the precedent’s existence. The explanation is not that the
subsequent court has come to agree with the precedent’s reasoning due to its
irresistible logic and persuasiveness. What is crucial about the precedent is
its issuance at some prior time.42 That temporal priority converts the
precedent into a “fundamental restraint” on the subsequent court’s power to
effectuate its own understanding of the Constitution’s meaning.43 By
contemplating the perpetuation of dubious or suboptimal interpretations, the
self-binding function of precedent raises serious challenges grounded in both
constitutional structure and the nature of the judicial process.44 It is that
function to which the balance of this Article is directed.45
The province in which constitutional precedent provides the most
substantial constraint can be defined as the set of cases in which a court
deems itself bound to accept a rule that it concludes or suspects is
substantively erroneous. The subsequent court may surmise that the
applicable precedent was unsound from the beginning,46 or it may believe the
rule has been undermined by the passage of time.47 Either way, the
subsequent court is put in the position of announcing a result that it currently
believes to reflect a likely misapplication of the Constitution.
The self-binding function of precedent is complicated by the Supreme
Court’s characterization of stare decisis as a matter of discretion rather than
compulsion.48 A court’s discretionary authority to overrule its own

42. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1987) (“If precedent
matters, a prior decision now believed erroneous still affects the current decision simply because it
is prior.”).
43. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
44. For a discussion of those challenges, see infra section III(A)(1) and subpart V(A).
45. As a corollary, the balance of the Article will deal with precedent in its horizontal
dimension—which implicates the doctrine of stare decisis in the sense of a court’s fidelity to its own
past self—rather than its vertical dimension of imposing binding constraints on inferior courts.
46. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (describing Bowers v. Hardwick as
“not correct when it was decided”).
47. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in
Constitutional Doctrine, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67, 71 (1988) (“[A] Justice may conclude
that a prior decision was premised on a state of affairs that has changed so much over time that the
Justices who reached the prior decision would themselves have reached a different result in light of
the changed circumstances.”).
48. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(contending that “none of” the Justices understand stare decisis in “absolute terms”); Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable command . . . .”);
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (“[S]tare decisis is a principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision . . . .”).
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precedents is not a strict requirement of common law jurisprudence. The
classic example of the contrary approach is the U.K. House of Lords, which
formerly depicted itself as foreclosed from reconsidering its past decisions.49
Notwithstanding debates over whether the House of Lords was always
faithful to this mandate in practice,50 it is certainly conceivable that a court
could treat its own precedents as utterly binding. Yet the U.S. Supreme
Court has chosen a different path. As a matter of horizontal constraint, the
Court views its precedents as only presumptively self-binding, not absolutely
so. To guide the inquiry into whether a dubious precedent should be
retained, the Court has enumerated an array of factors, including reliance
expectations, workability, evolving factual contexts, jurisprudential
coherence, the nature of the decisional rule contained in the precedent, and
the voting margin by which the precedent was issued.51 All the while, the
Justices have been unequivocal in preserving their prerogative to overrule
precedents under appropriate circumstances.52
* * *
The dynamics of horizontal self-binding lead to the “overwhelming
question”53 posed by any theory of constitutional precedent: When should a
court willfully perpetuate a reading of the Constitution that it would reject
but for the existence of precedent?

49. The formal move away from this approach occurred in 1966:
Their Lordships . . . recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to
injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law.
They propose, therefore, to modify their present practice and, while treating former
decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it
appears right to do so.
Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234.
50. See NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 127 (2008) (“Before
1966, the House of Lords had distinguished some of its own precedents to the point where they
were effectively stripped of authority. What had the House been doing in those instances, if not
‘departing from’ its previous decisions?” (footnote omitted)); Max Radin, The Trail of the Calf, 32
CORNELL L.Q. 137, 143 (1946) (arguing that the House of Lords “carried the technique of
distinguishing to a very high pitch of ingenuity”).
51. For a leading formulation of the components of the doctrine of stare decisis, see Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992). See also
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
412 (2012) (enumerating several of the common factors); Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial
Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 416–49 (2010) (analyzing the doctrine’s components).
52. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319 (concluding that “stare decisis does not compel
the continued acceptance” of the applicable precedent).
53. The words, though obviously not the context, are from T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of
J. Alfred Prufrock, POETRY, June 1915, reprinted in CATHOLIC ANTHOLOGY 1914-1915, at 2, 2
(1915). See also Jackson, supra note 37 (“To overrule an important precedent is serious business.
It calls for sober appraisal of the disadvantages of the innovation as well as those of the questioned
case, a weighing of practical effects of one against the other.”).
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Independent Effects of Constitutional Precedent

Certain implications of deferring to precedent are amenable to
preliminary scrutiny without regard to interpretive method. Those elements,
which I call the independent effects of precedent, are examined in the
subparts that follow. Subpart A addresses the independent benefits of
adhering to precedent for the sake of decisional continuity. Subpart B
examines the independent costs of continuity, meaning the detriments that
attend the preservation of a flawed decision. Part III then turns to the
dependent effects of precedent, whose composition is derivative of
methodological choices.
A.

Independent Benefits of Continuity

1. Expectations and Disruption.—The protection of settled expectations
is among the most prevalent justifications for deferring to precedent.54 When
a court issues an opinion, stakeholders modify their behaviors in response.55
Judicial delineation of the applicable rules affects commercial activities such
as the formation of contracts, allocation of investments, and organization of
business operations.56 It influences governmental decisions such as the
crafting of legislation designed to foster democratic objectives within lawful
bounds.57 It even affects societal understandings regarding the content of the
legal backdrop against which citizens arrange their lives.58

54. See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 673 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“The doctrine [of stare decisis] exists for the purpose of introducing
certainty and stability into the law and protecting the expectations of individuals and institutions
that have acted in reliance on existing rules.”); cf. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 157 (Touchstone 1991) (1990) (“In constitutional law, as
in all law, there is great virtue in stability. Governments need to know their powers, and citizens
need to know their rights; expectations about either should not lightly be upset.”); Stephen Breyer,
Making Our Democracy Work: The Yale Lectures, 120 YALE L.J. 1999, 2024 (2011) (“When the
Court considers the work of past Courts, the key concept is stare decisis while the key attitude
recognizes the importance of reliance.”).
55. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS
AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 239 (2012) (noting that there is an “equitable principle, prominent in
judicial decisions stretching back hundreds of years, [that] directs judges to give due weight to the
ways in which litigants who come before the Court may have reasonably relied upon prior case
law”).
56. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (recognizing that “reliance interests are important
considerations in property and contract cases, where parties may have acted in conformance with
existing legal rules in order to conduct transactions”); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,
317 (1992) (noting that the precedent in question “has engendered substantial reliance and has
become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry”).
57. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (plurality opinion) (“Buckley [v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam)] has promoted considerable reliance. Congress and state
legislatures have used Buckley when drafting campaign finance laws.”).
58. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (describing the impact of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), on “our national culture”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (discussing reliance by “people who have ordered their thinking
and living around” the rule of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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When the judiciary reverses course and announces a new rule, it
introduces a potentially dramatic source of disruption. Commercial
structures that seemed ingenious under the old regime become problematic or
even prohibited. Hard-fought and extensively researched legislation is
invalidated, with the lawmakers sent back to the drawing board for another
sapping of public resources. And widespread understandings about the legal
backdrop—as well as corresponding assumptions about the stability and
reliability of the legal equilibrium—are challenged, sometimes marginally
but sometimes substantially.59
By retaining a precedent despite its dubious merits, a court can prevent
these disturbances from coming to pass.60 That makes the avoidance of
disruption a principal benefit of precedential continuity. Such avoidance is
also an independent benefit. The unsettling effects of adjudicative change
reflect the degree to which stakeholders would be required to adapt their
behaviors and understandings to a revised legal order. There remain vast
differences of opinion regarding the quantum of evidence required to prove
those effects.61 In addition, there are significant debates about the types of
disruptions that should be relevant for purposes of stare decisis. For
example, some scholars contend that the potential disruption of societal
understandings caused by a judicial overruling—famously invoked in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey62 with respect to
abortion rights63—is too “inchoate” to serve as a valid component of stare
decisis doctrine.64 Others suggest that a full accounting should include
intangible, systemic reactions to legal change.65 Quite apart from these
debates, interpretive method is unnecessary to determine the degree to which
adjudicative change would upset expectations and require forward-looking
59. See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2013).
60. For an argument that the consequences of deviating from precedent are more aptly
described in terms of avoiding forward-looking disruption as opposed to backward-looking reliance,
see generally id. The distinction is immaterial for present purposes; both formulations are
independent of interpretive method.
61. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 956 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (describing the majority’s assertions relating to precedential reliance as
“undeveloped and totally conclusory”); Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 331–32 (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (describing the majority’s assertions of precedential reliance as
unsupported by evidence).
62. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
63. See id. at 856 (citing “two decades” of societal reliance upon “the availability of abortion in
the event that contraception should fail”).
64. Barnett, supra note 9, at 266.
65. Cf. Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 702 (1999) (“If private investment in contract and property
interests is sufficient to demand adherence to arguably erroneous precedent, public investment in
governmental structures should produce a similar effect.”); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and
Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 63 (2001) (“To the extent that a court’s
general willingness to overrule precedents increases uncertainty about which rules the court will
apply, it may also generate more systemic costs—costs that cannot be identified with any particular
change, but that are no less real.”).
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adjustments. Interpretive choices remain crucial to the level of significance
that is ultimately ascribed to protecting settled expectations.66 The extent of
disruption, however, does not fluctuate depending on one’s theory of
constitutional interpretation.
2. Rule of Law.—Intertwined with the avoidance of disruption is the
efficacy of stare decisis in promoting the rule of law. The rule of law
requires, among other things, that “people in positions of authority” operate
within a “constraining framework” of publicly available rules rather than
indulging “their own preferences or ideology.”67 It is sometimes described
(usefully, I think) in contradistinction to its converse, the rule of
individuals.68 Commitment to the rule of law may be driven by the perceived
consequentialist benefits of enhanced stability and order or by the belief that
“reciprocity and procedural fairness” in the imposition and enforcement of
legal requirements are “valuable for [their] own sake.”69 The Supreme Court
has gone so far as to pronounce the doctrine of stare decisis to be an essential
feature of a democratic society governed by the rule of law.70 Whether or not
the rule of law really does require a certain degree of respect for precedent,
much of the academic literature recognizes that, at very least, deference to
precedent can promote the rule of law in important ways.71
One way in which adherence to precedent advances the rule of law is by
fostering a sense of uniformity, consistency, and reliability. Part of the value
is tangible, allowing for better forecasting and more efficient planning. The
other part is intangible. In law as in life, the benefits of fidelity to precedent
include psychological comfort; predictability simply makes us “feel better.”72

66. Cf. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 321 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (noting that reliance on precedent “may not always carry the day”).
67. Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2012).
68. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1997) (making the contrast).
69. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 274 (2d ed. 2011).
70. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[T]he very
concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a
respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478–79 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“The rule of law depends in large part on
adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. Indeed, the doctrine is ‘a natural evolution from the very
nature of our institutions.’” (quoting W.M. Lile, Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis, 4 VA. L.
REV. 95, 97 (1916))); cf. Richard Primus, Response, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1227 (2010) (“One aspect of the rule of law is a set of legal norms
that are stable enough to enable planning and justify reliance.”).
71. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 67, at 31 (“I do not endorse the position . . . that ‘[t]he rule of
law depends in large part on adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis.’ But it might be true the
other way around: the justification of stare decisis might depend to a large extent on the rule of
law.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Welch, 483 U.S. at 478–79)).
72. Schauer, supra note 42, at 598; see also id. (“Predictability thus often has value even when
we cannot quantify it.”); cf. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (describing stare decisis
as “rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations”).
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That feeling extends to attitudes about the constancy of the legal regime and
the stability of the legal order.
The knowledge that a decision will serve as a precedent in future
litigation can also promote the rule of law by encouraging judges to view
individual cases as reflecting recurring problems that require generalizable,
forward-looking solutions.73 The resulting norm of “generality” reduces the
hazards of case-specific or party-specific idiosyncrasy in the adjudication of
disputes.74 Similarly, the infusion of precedent with durability that outlasts
the tenure of the issuing judges facilitates both the reality and appearance of
decisionmaking that is driven by considerations beyond individual
personalities.75 This ideal of impersonal adjudication resounds in then-Judge
Cardozo’s caution against allowing the decisions of courts to ebb and flow
with the “weekly changes in [their] composition”76 as well as Alexander
Hamilton’s famous depiction of precedent as a safeguard against the exercise
of “arbitrary discretion.”77
These rule of law benefits of following precedent arise independently of
interpretive method. There are, of course, plausible reasons to be skeptical
about the ability of precedent to enhance predictability, generate confidence
in the legal regime, contribute to the norm of generality, or reduce the impact
of individual idiosyncrasies. Among other things, a critic might contend that
the discretionary nature of constitutional stare decisis, which feeds the
perception of some commentators that the doctrine strikes “with the
randomness of a lightning bolt,”78 introduces its own layer of unpredictability
73. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1994) (“Because today’s decision will
be taken into account in future cases, the Court must judge not only what is best for today, but also
how the current decision will affect the decision of others cases in the future.”).
74. Waldron, supra note 67, at 19–20. But cf. Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in
Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399, 416–17 (2001) (noting the argument that “interpreters will
reason impartially if they anticipate that the decision may be invoked in future cases whose valence
in terms of the decisionmakers’ future interests is unpredictable” but responding that “it is hardly
clear that durability successfully dampens decisionmakers’ self-interest”).
75. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 26, at 853 (“Frequent or immediate overrulings, especially
when prompted by a change in personnel, cast into doubt courts’ commitment to making decisions
free from politics and personal whim.”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 753 (1988) (“If courts are viewed as unbound by precedent,
and the law as no more than what the last Court said, considerable efforts would be expended to get
control of such an institution—with judicial independence and public confidence greatly
weakened.”). For a comparable argument regarding reliance on precedent within the Office of
Legal Counsel, see Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 1448, 1497 (2010) (“Because OLC understands and advertises its job as providing legal
advice consistent with its best view of the law, its credibility depends on its appearing to conduct
itself in that manner. Adhering to precedent—and in particular, advertising that it adheres to
precedent—can contribute to that appearance.”).
76. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150 (1921).
77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (citing Hamilton’s language in
describing stare decisis as “a basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch”).
78. Monaghan, supra note 75, at 743.
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and exacerbates the effects of judicial personality.79 These are serious
claims, but interpretive method makes no difference to their validity. The
relevance of method only arises later, when a court weighs the rule of law
implications of continuity against the value of rectifying a constitutional
mistake or anachronism.
3. Decisional Economy and Resource Conservation.—The costliness of
a decision making process depends in part on the number of issues that
require determination. By limiting the matters that are open for debate in the
course of litigation, the doctrine of stare decisis can enhance adjudicative
economy.80
These efficiency-enhancing properties are most evident in the context of
hierarchical precedent. Given their unconditional obligation to follow the
decisions of superior tribunals, inferior federal courts are spared from
expending the resources needed to reach their own conclusions. Of course,
some of the resources that are saved must be redeployed to sorting through,
analogizing from, and distinguishing the array of potentially relevant
precedents. Moreover, in cases where the Supreme Court is considering
whether to abide by its own precedent, the lingering possibility of overruling
may prevent the Court from entirely disregarding the precedent’s merits and
effects. Nevertheless, efficiency benefits arise even in the horizontal context
from the choices of litigants to feature certain arguments and ignore others
on the (sensible) theory that many previously decided issues are unlikely to
be revisited in the near term.81
Within a typology that classifies the benefits of precedential continuity
based on their connection with interpretive method, efficiency represents
another independent consideration. Judicial efficiency is an established
concept relating to the amount of time and energy that is necessary to resolve
a case. The doctrinal implications of efficiency considerations—that is, their
power to affect the final stare decisis calculus—depend upon methodological
choices. Their composition does not.

79. See Waldron, supra note 67, at 13 (“[T]he principle of stare decisis seems to introduce its
own distinctive uncertainty into the law, particularly insofar as it does not operate as an absolute.”).
But see DUXBURY, supra note 50, at 167 (“The activity [of precedent following] can be commended
. . . because it eradicates only some judicial discretion; for were it to eradicate all judicial discretion,
the doctrine of stare decisis would be inappropriate to the common law.”).
80. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 76, at 149 (“[T]he labor of judges would be increased
almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case . . . .”); Fallon,
supra note 7, at 573 (“The doctrine [of stare decisis] liberates the Justices from what otherwise
would be a constitutional obligation to reconsider every potentially disputable issue as if it were
being raised for the first time . . . .”).
81. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 903–04 (2008) (asserting that “even where stare
decisis is not dispositive, ‘the human tendency not to waste money will deter the bringing of suits
based on claims or issues that have already been adversely determined against others’” (quoting
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 97 (2001))).
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B. Independent Costs of Continuity
1. Workability.—Judicial decisions that have proved cumbersome in
operation are commonly singled out as prime candidates for
reconsideration.82 The retention of such precedents imposes costs on the
legal system. When a decision is difficult for subsequent courts to
understand and apply, the efficiency of decisionmaking is hindered.83
Unworkable precedents can also breed uncertainty by reducing the ability of
litigants, attorneys, and other stakeholders to plan their behaviors and
forecast litigation outcomes.84
A precedent’s workability is an independent consideration that is
determined based on its clarity of exposition and practical operation.85
Different jurists will evince different tolerances for what degree of
clumsiness renders a precedent so unworkable as to warrant revision.86 They
likewise will apply their respective tests differently to concrete sets of facts.87
But the metrics by which workability is assessed need not be bound up with
methodological choices. The question whether a precedent’s retention is
likely to breed uncertainty and hinder judicial administration can be
answered ex ante, prior to any methodological election.
2. Jurisprudential Coherence.—The steady accumulation of legal
doctrine makes it inevitable that discrete bodies of precedent occasionally

82. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009) (“[T]he fact that a decision has
proved ‘unworkable’ is a traditional ground for overruling it.” (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 827 (1991))).
83. See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the
Supreme Court’s Doctrine of Precedent, 78 N.C. L. REV. 643, 670 (2000) (“[U]nworkable decisions
are by definition uncertain, so their retention should be expected to require ongoing and inefficient
expenditures on measures aimed at divining their application and effect.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and
Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1552 (2000) (“The inquiry into ‘workability,’ as framed by the Court,
is essentially a question of whether the Court believes itself able to continue working within a
framework established by a prior decision. The unworkability of precedent provides additional
incentive for the judiciary to overrule it.”).
84. See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965) (“[Precedent] should not be kept on
the books in the name of stare decisis once it is proved to be unworkable in practice; the
mischievous consequences to litigants and courts alike from the perpetuation of an unworkable rule
are too great.”).
85. Compare, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 360 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting) (finding a
precedent to be workable where it provided “a test that would be relatively easy for police officers
and judges to apply”), with Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 64 (1996) (finding a
precedent to be unworkable where it had “created confusion among the lower courts that [had]
sought to understand and apply [it]”).
86. Compare Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 84 (2008) (reaffirming a precedent despite
acknowledging its lack of “‘theoretical elegance’” (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 529 n.27 (1992) (plurality opinion))), with id. at 97 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding that
the precedent should be overruled because, inter alia, it “has proved unworkable”).
87. Compare Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (defending Miranda’s
workability), with id. at 463–64 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (assailing Miranda’s workability). See
Montejo, 556 U.S. at 808 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s labeling of a precedent
as unworkable).
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will come into apparent conflict.88 One line of cases protects corporations’
constitutional right to participate in political referenda campaigns, while
another denies them the right to speak in support of political candidates.89
One line upholds the power of a state to criminalize sexual conduct between
people of the same gender, while another suggests a relevant sphere of
personal privacy in which governmental influence is severely constrained.90
The examples are legion, and they will continue to proliferate as overlapping
lines of constitutional precedent become more robust and nuanced. The
doctrine of stare decisis has taken notice.91
If a reviewing court allows two or more competing lines of precedent to
coexist, it risks exacting a toll on jurisprudential coherence. Lower courts
and stakeholders may find it difficult to determine which doctrinal strand
applies to a given course of conduct. The likely results include inefficiencies
caused by the need for extensive analysis and uncertainty among
stakeholding parties as to how to organize their affairs.92 Jurisprudential
incoherence also threatens systemic impacts by reducing the rationality, both
actual and apparent, of the legal order.93
Notwithstanding the significance of these effects, interpretive method
once again is inapposite to their composition. Competing precedents can be
difficult for stakeholders to square regardless of the methodological
approaches those precedents embody. As for the systemic costs of
incoherence, they arise from dissonance between judicial decisions
irrespective of underlying methodological preferences.

88. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 232 (1995) (O’Connor, J.)
(“We cannot adhere to our most recent decision without colliding with an accepted and established
doctrine.”); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940) (“But stare decisis is a principle of
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and
questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its
scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.”).
89. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 348 (2010) (“The Court is thus confronted with
conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line that forbids restrictions on political speech based on
the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line that permits them.”).
90. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (“The foundations of Bowers have
sustained serious erosion from our recent decisions in Casey and Romer [v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996)].”).
91. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 31 (noting the Supreme Court’s receptiveness to
overruling precedent based on “irreconcilability with subsequent case law”). The appeal to
jurisprudential coherence as a justification for departing from precedent is no recent innovation. See
Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The “Art” of Overruling, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 211, 223
(noting that the Supreme Court often “attempted to buttress its position by showing that the
rejection of the overruled case was required, or at least suggested, by other, later decisions basically
inconsistent with its earlier ruling”).
92. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 847 (“Legal incoherence in
jurisprudence has negative consequences because individuals have more trouble complying with a
set of rules that are incoherent and hard to understand.”).
93. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 144 (2008) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“It damages the coherence of the law if we cling to outworn precedent at odds with
later, more enlightened decisions.”).
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3. Rule of Law (Redux).—The previous section discussed the rule of
law benefits that can arise from the preservation of settled precedent. There
is also a second aspect to the relationship between precedent and the rule of
law, one that cuts in the opposite direction.94 Consciously entrenching
erroneous decisions can impair the soundness of the legal regime.95
Behaviors that should create one set of constitutional ramifications instead
yield a very different set. Litigants who would have been victorious if
certain precedents were not on the books are forced to endure losses for the
sake of continuity.96 In theory, perhaps those litigants should take solace in
knowing that the legal system is stronger for their sacrifice and that a portion
of the benefits of living in such a system eventually will trickle down to
them, or at least to their descendants.97 In reality, that prospect seems like
cold comfort in the here and now. In any event, using the doctrine of stare
decisis to entrench interpretations that depart from the best understanding
(however defined) of the Constitution poses a challenge to the democratic
nature of the constitutional order.98 This, too, may represent a rule of law
concern, at least if one believes the American rule of law to be bound up with
popular sovereignty and democratic pedigree.
Excessive deference to flawed constitutional precedents can also
threaten to create systemic concerns for the rule of law. In the worst-case
scenario, society is forced to endure pervasive misapplications of its most
important document. The ability to agitate for legal changes through
reasoned argumentation becomes seriously impaired.99 The prospects for
“growth and reexamination” are gradually “choke[d] off” by reams of
ossified precedents.100 And the nation’s constitutional culture suffers as the

94. See Fallon, supra note 68, at 5 (“[I]n contemporary constitutional discourse it is by no
means anomalous to find competing Rule-of-Law claims arrayed against each other.”).
95. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(“[I]n the unusual circumstance when fidelity to any particular precedent does more to damage [the]
constitutional ideal [of the rule of law] than to advance it, we must be more willing to depart from
that precedent.”); cf. Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice
in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2034 (1996) (arguing that “stare decisis has the potential to
import injustice irremediably into the law”).
96. See Randy J. Kozel, The Rule of Law and the Perils of Precedent, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 37, 40 (2013).
97. Cf. 1 JOHN HICKS, The Rehabilitation of Consumers’ Surplus, in COLLECTED ESSAYS ON
ECONOMIC THEORY: WEALTH AND WELFARE 100, 105 (1981) (suggesting that certain
enhancements to productive efficiency that leave some parties worse off can nevertheless create a
“strong probability that almost all [inhabitants of the community] would be better off after the lapse
of a sufficient length of time”).
98. Cf. Nelson, supra note 65, at 62 (arguing that “the primary reason we want courts to avoid
erroneous interpretations of the written law is that we value democracy”).
99. See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008) (“The
procedural side of the Rule of Law presents a mode of governance that allows people a voice, a way
of intervening on their own behalf in confrontations with power. It requires that public institutions
sponsor and facilitate reasoned argument in human affairs.”).
100. Stone, supra note 47, at 69.
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polity lapses into resignation due to its perception of constitutional law as
defying realistic efforts at improvement.101
I am not suggesting that anything like this bleak picture actually obtains
in contemporary American practice. My point is simply that it is too facile to
describe precedent and the rule of law as engaged in a common and mutually
reinforcing enterprise. It may be true that, on balance, the rule of law is
better served by having a doctrine of constitutional stare decisis than it would
be without one.102 Yet it does not follow that the retention of erroneous
precedents is entirely positive from the standpoint of the rule of law. Finally,
and most importantly for present purposes, the rule of law implications of
precedent are independent effects of continuity. They maintain the same
shape regardless of the interpretive method that one prefers.
4. Justice and Policy.—Fidelity to precedent might entail the
entrenchment of a rule that is unjust or undesirable from a policy perspective.
Debates about such values can proceed independently of interpretive
methodology. Whether an outcome is immoral or otherwise detrimental can
be determined prior to any interpretive election; such values have inherent
content apart from one’s interpretive philosophy.
The function of
interpretive methodology is to shape the extent to which those, and other,
values are appropriate matters for judicial consideration in construing the
Constitution’s meaning.
III. Building the Bridge to Constitutional Method
The independent effects of precedential continuity are critical to
assessing the ramifications of adjudicative change. They reflect the value of
allowing the law to remain settled by focusing attention on considerations
such as reliance and disruption. And some of them—including the benefit
that overruling a flawed precedent can create for jurisprudential coherence
and doctrinal workability—begin to capture the potential virtues of breaking
with the past.

101. See Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1061 (2010) (describing the argument that “[i]f constitutional meaning were
irrevocably settled, some groups would be permanently cast as constitutional losers, eliminating or
reducing their sense of participation in a shared community”); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2006) (“In a normatively divided polity, a system that permanently
resolves the Constitution’s meaning risks permanently estranging groups in ways that a system
enabling a perpetual quest to shape constitutional meaning does not.”); cf. Fallon, supra note 7, at
584 (noting that “[w]ithin our constitutional regime, it is healthy for there to be some degree of
ferment and reconsideration” but cautioning that “it would overtax the Court and the country alike
to insist . . . that everything always must be up for grabs at once”).
102. I tend to believe that this is indeed the case. For a very brief introduction to the issue, see
Kozel, supra note 96, at 40–44.
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But the value of interpretive accuracy also has another dimension: the
benefits that would arise directly from the replacement of the flawed rule
with the proper one. This dimension of accuracy reflects the proximate
consequences of implementing the optimal constitutional interpretation rather
than deferring to an erroneous precedent.
A.

Interpretive Method and the Dependent Value of Accuracy

The most direct impacts of improving upon a flawed constitutional rule
are twofold: the elimination of harms that would otherwise result from the
flawed precedent’s continued operation, and the generation of affirmative
benefits that arise from implementing the superior rule. Neither component
can be analyzed in the abstract. The following sections explain that the value
of correcting an erroneous decision is a fundamentally dependent aspect of
abandoning precedent. It requires the integration of interpretive method and
underlying normative premises.103
It warrants emphasizing that my aim is not to align myself with any
particular movement in constitutional theory. Nor is it to propose my own,
alternative constitutional methodology. I seek to demonstrate that whatever
one’s interpretive theory of choice, it will be inextricably linked to the proper
treatment of constitutional precedents and questions of stare decisis.
1. The Originalist Perspective.—Begin by considering one of the most
impactful methodologies in modern constitutional discourse: originalism.
The originalist school posits that the meaning of constitutional terms was
“determined at the time the text was written and adopted.”104 Over the past
three decades, debate has swirled around the question of which determinants
of original meaning should predominate. An early version of originalism
emphasized the primacy of the subjective intentions of the Constitution’s
Framers.105 The intentionalist position drew criticism based on the claimed
artificiality of constructing an aggregated version of the Framers’
intentions.106 There was also the problem of defining who the relevant

103. I use the concept of “interpretive” method to indicate both the discernment of the
Constitution’s semantic meaning and the conversion of that meaning into legal doctrine. Some
commentators emphasize the distinction between these two tasks, dubbing the former
“interpretation” and the latter “construction.” E.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation–
Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 100–03 (2010). The analysis presented in this
Article is not affected by one’s view of the distinction, so for simplicity I include both concepts
under the label of “interpretation.” Cf. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 4–5 (2011) (noting
the prevalence of this practice as a usage convention).
104. Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional
Redemption, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 147, 154 (2012); see also id. at 154–55 (describing this proposition
as the “fixation thesis,” and distinguishing it from the “constraint principle,” which provides that
“original meaning should have binding or constraining force”).
105. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134–35 (2003).
106. Id. at 1135.
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“Framers” were: the Philadelphia Convention, state ratifying conventions, or
some other segment of the population.107
The dominant strand of originalism transformed, eventually moving the
analytical focus from the Framers’ intentions to the objective public meaning
of the Constitution’s text.108 For proponents of this “New Originalism,” the
interpretive touchstone is the Constitution’s language as it would have been
understood at the time of ratification.109 Debates over the intricacies of
originalist method continue apace, but the recasting in terms of objective
meaning as opposed to subjective intention has emerged as the prevalent
(though not exclusive) formulation.110
The debates within the originalist school extend beyond identifying the
proper referents of original meaning. The deep theoretical justifications for
originalism also vary significantly as between the philosophy’s adherents.
One version of originalism is especially useful in illustrating the relationship
between interpretive method and constitutional precedent. That version,
which we might call structural originalism in light of its connection with the
Constitution’s nature, text, and design,111 is often associated with commentators such as Gary Lawson.112 Professor Lawson justifies his support
for originalism by reference to the implicit lesson of Marbury v. Madison113
that judicial review of enacted legislation is authorized only because the
Constitution itself is “hierarchically superior to all other claimed sources of
law.”114 The same principle, Professor Lawson argues, forecloses deference
to judicial precedents that misconstrue the Constitution; a judge who believes
that the Constitution’s original meaning dictates a certain result may never

107. Id. at 1135–36. What is perhaps the most famous criticism of intentions-based originalism
is Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
108. Solum, supra note 104, at 153–54.
109. See id. (defining New Originalism as based on the theory that “the original meaning of the
Constitution is the original public meaning of the constitutional text”); see also Randy E. Barnett,
An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 (1999) (“[O]riginalism has itself
changed—from original intention to original meaning.”).
110. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006) (“Ever since 1986, when then-Judge Antonin Scalia articulated the
distinction between original intent . . . and original meaning . . . modern originalists have moved
steadily towards the latter.”). But see, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning
in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 714 (2009) (defending a paramount focus
on original intentions).
111. For a concise summary of the relevance of these factors to the structuralist position, see
Gary Lawson, Rebel Without a Clause: The Irrelevance of Article VI to Constitutional Supremacy,
110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 33, 36–37 (2011).
112. See generally Lawson, supra note 32; cf. Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The
Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (accepting the use of
constitutional precedent “if, but only if, the precedent is the best available evidence of the right
answer to constitutional questions”).
113. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
114. Lawson, supra note 32, at 26; see also id. at 28 (“[T]he case for judicial review of
legislative or executive action is precisely coterminous with the case for judicial review of prior
judicial action.”).
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depart from that result for reasons of stare decisis.115 Along with Professor
Lawson, Michael Paulsen has advocated a vision of structural originalism at
odds with constitutional stare decisis.116 In Professor Paulsen’s words,
deference to erroneous precedents “undermines—even refutes—the premises
that are supposed to justify originalism.”117
For a jurist who follows commentators like Professors Lawson and
Paulsen in emphasizing the Constitution’s structural superiority to its judicial
gloss, flawed precedents must be overruled regardless of the degree of
resulting disruption.118 Once one adopts a method that treats a certain
category of precedents as ultra vires and illegitimate, no weighing of
countervailing considerations is necessary. The flawed precedents are too
harmful to tolerate, and they accordingly must be abandoned. On the
rationale of the structural originalists, then, all erroneous precedents are
situated identically.
This is true even of highly controversial cases like Roe v. Wade,119
assuming arguendo that, as some Justices and commentators maintain, Roe
reflects a misapplication of the Constitution. Notwithstanding the leading
role played by Roe and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey—which reaffirmed Roe’s “essential holding” regarding the
constitutional protection of abortion120—in stirring certain originalist
challenges to stare decisis,121 for the structural originalist Roe is no more
problematic than any other constitutional mistake. Every departure from
original meaning is equally in need of correction. The fact that Roe dealt
with issues of abortion and substantive due process is doctrinally inapposite.
2. The Living Constitutionalist Perspective.—Compare the structural
originalist position with an interpretive method that supplants original

115. See id. at 27–28 (“If the Constitution says X and a prior judicial decision says Y, a court
has not merely the power, but the obligation, to prefer the Constitution.”); cf. THE FEDERALIST
NO. 78, supra note 77, at 465–66 (“There is no position which depends on clearer principles than
that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is
exercised, is void.”).
116. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22
CONST. COMMENT. 289 (2005).
117. Id. at 289.
118. Randy Barnett has sketched an approach to stare decisis similar to that of Professors
Lawson and Paulsen. See Barnett, supra note 9, at 259 (“Accepting that judicial precedent can
trump original meaning puts judges above the Constitution they are supposed to be following, not
making.”). Professor Barnett’s underlying normative premises, however, are distinctive. He
emphasizes fidelity to the written Constitution as a means of legitimating its application to those
who never expressly consented to it. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 117 (2004) (“Only if lawmakers cannot change the
scope of their own powers can the rights of the people be in any way assured. In this way,
constitutional legitimacy based on natural rights, rather than popular sovereignty or consent, can
ground a commitment to originalism.”).
119. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
120. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
121. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 83, at 1539 (“My motivation for writing, revealed in the
style of my presentation, is one that openly reflects a desire that Roe be overturned.”).
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meaning with factors such as contemporary understandings, mores, and
policy judgments. In modern parlance such approaches are often grouped
under the heading of living constitutionalism.122
Among the most influential advocates of living constitutionalism is
David Strauss, who has articulated a common law approach to constitutional
interpretation. The common law constitutionalist’s point of departure is
“rational traditionalism,” which regards past practice as significant for
reasons of humility and restraint.123 This rational traditionalism is paired
with a principle of “conventionalism” that promotes “allegiance to the text of
the Constitution” not out of any particular fidelity to the text itself,124 but
rather “as a way of avoiding costly and risky disputes and of expressing
respect for fellow citizens.”125 Precedent, however, is neither infallible nor
obligatory. While there is significant value in tradition and convention, the
need remains for evolution toward a constitutional order that is morally
sound. The virtues of adhering to the past can thus be overcome by a
subsequent court’s moral or policy judgments.126 Whether a flawed
precedent should be overruled depends in large part on its substance: The
judge must ask how confident she is that a “given practice is wrong” and
how severe the practical consequences of that wrongness are likely to be.127
For a living constitutionalist like Professor Strauss, a precedent’s
consistency with the Constitution’s original meaning cannot resolve whether
the precedent was decided correctly or incorrectly. Moreover, even if one
concludes based on a combination of text, tradition, and policy that a given
precedent represents a misapplication of the Constitution, it does not
necessarily follow that the precedent is so harmful as to warrant overruling.

122. Cf. STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 1 (“A ‘living constitution’ is one that evolves, changes over
time, and adapts to new circumstances, without being formally amended.”).
123. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
891 (1996) (“[T]he traditionalism that is central to common law constitutionalism is based on
humility and, related, a distrust of the capacity of people to make abstract judgments not grounded
in experience.”).
124. Id. at 911; see David A. Strauss, We the People, They the People, and the Puzzle of
Democratic Constitutionalism, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 1969, 1969 (2013) (arguing that in difficult
constitutional disputes, the text of the Constitution “plays a limited role”).
125. Strauss, supra note 123, at 911.
126. Id. at 894; see also id. at 902 (“The reason for adhering to judgments made in the past is
the counsel of humility and the value of experience. Moral or policy arguments can be sufficiently
strong to outweigh those traditionalist concerns to some degree, and to the extent they do,
traditionalism must give way.”); cf. William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735,
739 (1949) (“Precedents are made or unmade not on logic and history alone. The choices left by the
generality of a constitution relate to policy.”).
127. See Strauss, supra note 123, at 895 (“If one is quite confident that a practice is wrong—or
if one believes, even with less certainty, that it is terribly wrong—this conception of traditionalism
permits the practice to be eroded or even discarded.”); cf. Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1998) (“The role of the constitutional interpreter
is to reconcile our deepest constitutional commitments, revealed by all of our constitutional history,
with today’s preferences.”); id. at 63–64 (“When mining our history, we need to look to the actions
and positions of constitutional actors ranging well beyond the courts.”).
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The perseverance of the precedent might be taken as evincing an
“accumulated practical wisdom” that strengthens its claim to continued
retention.128 At the same time, even longstanding precedents may become
vulnerable based on their troublesome consequences.129
The contrast with structural originalism is stark. Because structural
originalism treats all decisions that deviate from the Constitution’s original
meaning as irreparably and dispositively flawed, there is no need for
distinguishing among erroneous precedents to decide which should be
retained and which should be overruled. From the perspective of living
constitutionalism, by comparison, drawing such distinctions is vital. Some
erroneous precedents are indeed too harmful to tolerate, but others should
endure. The value of constitutional accuracy can vary depending on the
nature of a given constitutional mistake. The question becomes whether the
substantive “stakes” of perpetuating the error are “high enough” to justify a
reversal of course.130
To return to the previous section’s example, in deciding whether a case
like Roe should be overruled, the living constitutionalist first needs to assess
that case’s societal effects. If Roe’s effects are deemed to be only mildly or
moderately negative, there will be a strong argument for reaffirmance in light
of the countervailing costs of change. If, however, Roe’s protection of
abortion is viewed as severely harmful in substantive terms, the appropriate
response might well be an overruling based on considerations of justice or
social policy. As an alternative, one might conclude that assessing the
aggregate harmfulness of a constitutional right to abortion is a matter that
exceeds the bounds of judicial competence. In that event, the need would
arise for a supplemental theory, with an independent normative basis, for
determining whether the appropriate course is to reaffirm Roe or rather to
deconstitutionalize abortion rights and leave them to the Legislative and
Executive Branches.131 The resolution of these issues is unavoidable under a
living constitutionalist approach that defines the value of constitutional
accuracy in terms of sound policy and contemporary mores. The appropriate
precedential effect of cases like Roe must remain undefined unless and until
those issues are addressed.

128. STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 96.
129. See Strauss, supra note 123, at 895 (“Nearly everyone . . . recognizes that sometimes we
must depart from the teachings of the past because we think they are not just or do not serve human
needs.”); cf. Fallon, supra note 7, at 584 (“An entrenched precedent that is normatively
reprehensible should be viewed as vulnerable in a way that a more attractive practice is not.”).
130. Strauss, supra note 123, at 897.
131. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Abortion, Toleration, and Moral Uncertainty, 1992 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 4 (arguing that “[i]n cases of true moral uncertainty, an issue should be resolved at the level
that minimizes the risk that some group of people will be unacceptably subordinated by the decision
makers”).
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3. Synthesis.—Comparing the originalist and living constitutionalist
methodologies begins to uncover the problem with posing the abstract query
of whether stare decisis supports the retention of a dubious decision. The
question is unanswerable until one’s theory of precedent is situated within a
broader vision of constitutional interpretation. For adherents of structural
originalism, the calculus is simple. If a given constitutional precedent is
incorrect, it must be overruled—just like every other precedent that deviates
from the original meaning of the Constitution’s text. The fate of a flawed
precedent is less certain on the living constitutionalist account. There must
first be an evaluation of the harmfulness likely to attend the precedent’s
retention, which depends in part on the severity of the individual and social
costs it imposes.
While I have made reference to Roe as a useful illustration, the same
analysis applies across the universe of constitutional precedents. From the
standpoint of stare decisis, the structural originalist should discern no
difference among erroneous precedents that allow the restriction of corporate
political speech,132 prohibit the criminalization of same-sex intimate
conduct,133 require the evidentiary exclusion of certain statements by
criminal suspects,134 or forbid the use of racial preferences in admission to
public universities.135 Assuming (again, arguendo) that these decisions
represent departures from the Constitution’s original meaning, considerations
of stare decisis are categorically unavailing. The cases must be overruled.
For the living constitutionalist, not all interpretive mistakes are created
equal. The decision whether to retain a dubious precedent will be informed
by the consequences that arise from the continued operation of the flawed
rule. How severe is the social harm posed by withholding protection from
corporate speech rights or the right to engage in same-sex intimate conduct?
What about the harm posed by requiring the exclusion of criminal
defendants’ voluntary statements because they were not precipitated by the
Miranda warnings? Or the harm caused by using racial characteristics in
university admissions? The living constitutionalist must engage these issues
in order to determine the value of getting the law right.
The fact that living constitutionalism entails a more complex approach
to precedent is not necessarily a weakness. Demanding the rectification of
every mistaken precedent, as the structural originalist position requires,
arguably reflects insufficient regard for the importance of legal stability.136 It

132. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010) (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
133. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986)).
134. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444; (2000) (reaffirming Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
135. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
136. Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2244
(1997) (arguing with respect to the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870), that “[t]he
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might follow that the living constitutionalist approach to precedent is
superior despite its thorniness in application. Alternatively, one may be
persuaded by the structural originalist argument that, practical consequences
aside, the Constitution does not permit the privileging of case law over
original meaning.137 In that event, the structural originalist view is justified
in treating interpretive accuracy as paramount. The more general point is
that whatever the precedent under review, the perceived value of accuracy
will vary, often substantially, from one interpretive method to another.
Constitutional methodologies and theories of precedent go hand in hand.
B.

From Interpretive Method to Normative Premises

No one is born an originalist. Nor is anyone born a living
constitutionalist. We arrive at our methodological philosophies through
normative choices, explicit or implicit, about the manner in which the
Constitution ought to be interpreted.138 This phenomenon is characteristic
across academic disciplines.139 Constitutional theory is no exception.
The role of normative premises adds another layer to the relationship
between precedent and constitutional method. I claimed in the previous
subpart that it is impossible to determine the value of rectifying an erroneous
constitutional rule without drawing on a specified interpretive method. This
subpart contends that while the integration of method is necessary, it is not
sufficient. A single philosophy may spring from any number of distinct
ideological commitments. Even within a particular school, such as
originalism or living constitutionalism, there are vast differences in
normative underpinnings that can dramatically alter the perceived gravity of
constitutional mistakes.
1. Divergent Strands of Originalism.—As we have seen, some
originalists base their interpretive philosophy on considerations of
constitutional structure. In their view, the Constitution’s status as the
“supreme Law of the Land,”140 which is the lynchpin of judicial review as
pioneered in Marbury, forecloses deference to flawed constitutional

Court would be behaving in an extraordinarily irresponsible manner if it overruled a precedent in
circumstances in which its decision destroyed trillions of dollars of investments made in reliance on
that precedent”).
137. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
138. See Lash, supra note 12, at 1439 (noting the role of “normative theory” in informing one’s
interpretive philosophy and approach to precedent).
139. See Ian Bartrum, Constitutional Value Judgments and Interpretive Theory Choice, 40 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 259, 265–66, 286 (2013) (discussing THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) and arguing that “just as with scientific choices, no apparent
transcendent kind of rule can compel, rather than influence, our choice between [interpretive
modalities]”).
140. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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precedents.141 Judges take an oath to support the Constitution and are “bound
by the text as law.”142 Erroneous precedents are beyond toleration; they must
yield to the Constitution itself.143
Structuralist arguments are but one path to originalism.144 Other
commentators champion the originalist approach for reasons that are overtly
consequentialist. Prominent among them are John McGinnis and Michael
Rappaport, who emphasize the presumptive societal benefits of
implementing the Constitution’s supermajoritarian dictates.145 The essence
of their position is that fidelity to original meaning is desirable because the
Constitution was “enacted in accordance with a supermajoritarian process
that generally produces beneficial provisions.”146 Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport also cite other consequentialist advantages of originalism in the
form of legal clarity, judicial restraint, and the channeling of efforts at
revision through the formal amendment process.147
The consequentialist strand of originalism makes it necessary to
distinguish among erroneous precedents in a way that structural originalism
does not contemplate. Implicit in the consequentialist approach is the
suggestion that the most harmful constitutional mistakes are those that
remain politically divisive and defy supermajoritarian consensus.148 The
141. See supra section III(A)(1); see also, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 105, at 1127
(“This clause, conventionally called the Supremacy Clause, but probably as aptly termed the
‘Supreme Law Clause,’ establishes the text of the document . . . as that which purports to be
authoritative.”); Paulsen, supra note 116, at 291 (contending that “the argument for judicial review
in Marbury” is grounded “in the supremacy of the Constitution”).
142. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 105, at 1127–28; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3
(stating that “judicial Officers . . . shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation . . . to support this
Constitution”).
143. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 116, at 291 (“[C]ourts must apply the correct interpretation
of the Constitution, never a precedent inconsistent with the correct interpretation. It follows, then,
that if Marbury is right (and it is), stare decisis is unconstitutional.”).
144. See Lash, supra note 12, at 1440 (“Because originalism is an interpretive method and not a
normative constitutional theory, different originalists advance different normative grounds for their
interpretive approach.”); Solum, supra note 104, at 1 (“Even today, originalists disagree among
themselves about a variety of important questions, including the normative justification for a
constitutional practice that adheres to original meaning.”); cf. Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for
Foreign Affairs?, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 5, 9–10 (2008) (recognizing normative differences among
strands of originalism and discussing their implications for matters of foreign affairs).
145. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good
Constitution, 98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1695 (2010) (“A constitution that is enacted under a strict
supermajority process is likely to be desirable because such a process has features appropriate for
determining the content of entrenched laws . . . .”).
146. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 804–05; see also id. at 830 (“Strict
supermajority rules help to assure that constitutional provisions are supported by a consensus. They
also impede the passage of partisan measures because support from both parties is needed for
enactment.”).
147. See id. at 831–34 (discussing the relative benefits of following original meaning and
precedent, respectively).
148. Cf. id. at 837 (advocating favorable treatment of “entrenched precedents” that “are so
strongly supported that they would be enacted by constitutional amendment if they were overturned
by the courts”).

1872

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:1843

converse is also true. Thus, irrespective of whether a case like Brown v.
Board of Education149 was decided correctly from the perspective of original
meaning,150 its continued retention is unproblematic because its principles
enjoy such widespread public support.151 This rationale illuminates a central
difference between consequentialist originalism and its structuralist cousin,
the latter of which recognizes no possibility that an erroneous precedent
could legitimately be reaffirmed due to its popular acceptance.152 The
juxtaposition of consequentialist and structuralist originalism also illustrates
that just as there is no “universal” theory of constitutional precedent, there
likewise is no “originalist” theory of constitutional precedent. Before the
principles of stare decisis can be applied, there must be a deeper inquiry into
the normative premises that support the various formulations of originalism.
Some originalists will defer to a particular type of precedent, while others
will not.
The crucial role of normative premises can be underscored by
introducing a third version of originalism, this one driven by notions of
popular sovereignty. Among the ablest proponents of popular-sovereignty
originalism is Kurt Lash. Professor Lash defends the centrality of “the right
of a political majority to determine policy in a democratic government” and
the unique ability of constitutional rules to embody “the will of the
people.”153 On the popular-sovereigntist account, the value of rectifying a
mistaken precedent depends in large part on the extent of its intrusion into
the democratic process.154 The most troubling situations are those in which
the Supreme Court has unjustifiably protected an asserted right, thereby
preventing political correction through anything short of constitutional
amendment.155 Other constitutional mistakes are less severe in their intensity
because, for example, their flaw is the failure to protect a constitutional right

149. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
150. Michael McConnell has taken the contrary position, arguing that Brown is consistent with
principles of originalist interpretation. See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1140 (1995) (“[S]chool segregation was understood
during Reconstruction to violate the principles of equality of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
151. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 12, at 837–38 (noting with respect to such cases
that “[t]he benefits of following the original meaning are small because there is strong support for
the new constitutional rule announced in the precedent”).
152. See supra notes 111–17 and accompanying text.
153. Lash, supra note 12, at 1444–45; see also id. at 1445 (“In a constitutional democracy, the
laws of the Constitution trump the laws of the mere majority, not because majoritarian laws are
illegitimate, but because a variety of factors tend to undermine the link between the will of political
actors and the actual majoritarian will of the people.” (footnotes omitted)).
154. Id. at 1442.
155. Id. at 1443. For an alternative view of constitutional precedent that shares a focus on
popular sovereignty, see AMAR, supra note 55, at 238 (contending that if an unenumerated right is
erroneously recognized but later “catches fire and captures the imagination of a wide swathe of
citizens, it thereby becomes a proper Ninth Amendment entitlement even though the Court . . .
jumped the gun”).
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rather than the entrenchment of a right that should not exist.156 In those
cases, there is the prospect of majoritarian correction through the ordinary
legislative process.157 The availability of a majoritarian solution weakens the
need for judicial overruling as a safeguard of popular sovereignty.158
While popular-sovereignty originalism resembles consequentialist
originalism at the most basic level by recognizing a legitimate province for
the reaffirmance of erroneous precedents, the types of precedents that may be
retained will vary between the two approaches in accordance with their
respective normative baselines.159 The broader takeaway is that the
normative underpinnings that drive one’s acceptance of originalism have a
significant effect on one’s treatment of constitutional precedent.160 While
there may be common threads among different strands of originalism, their
respective approaches to precedent can diverge in meaningful ways.
2. Divergent Strands of Living Constitutionalism.—The necessity of
grounding a theory of precedent in an underlying set of normative premises
extends beyond originalism. Living constitutionalism faces the same
obligation, and for precisely the same reason.
Like originalists, living constitutionalists subscribe to varying belief
sets. The strand of living constitutionalism articulated by David Strauss
acknowledges that deviations from settled law can be justified for compelling
reasons of “fairness and social policy,” but it nevertheless places a premium
on maintaining continuity over time through the adoption of a common law
approach.161 Other living constitutionalists are less tethered to gradual
progression and more receptive to judicial innovations that advance the
“constitutional frontier.”162 Common law constitutionalism emphasizes the

156. Lash, supra note 12, at 1443.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 1442 (“[W]here erroneous precedents do not threaten or frustrate majoritarian
government, the pragmatic considerations of stare decisis are more applicable.”).
159. Professor Lash does leave open the possibility that an exceptional case like Brown, “even
if originally in error,” might warrant retention based on its “de facto supermajoritarian political
ratification.” Id. at 1471.
160. The three strands of originalism I have discussed are, I think, sufficient to prove this point.
But they are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the competing versions of originalism. For one
additional example that remains mindful of the interplay between precedent and normative
premises, see Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist
Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 436 (2006) (contending that “judges
should overrule nonoriginalist constitutional precedent unless doing so would gravely harm
society’s pursuit of the common good”).
161. STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 38, 45; Strauss, supra note 123, at 895–97; cf. Michael C. Dorf,
The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2012 (2012) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN,
LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011) & DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010))
(describing Professor Strauss’s position that “the common law method itself confers legitimacy on
the Court’s decisions”).
162. See Justin Driver, The Significance of the Frontier in American Constitutional Law, 2011
SUP. CT. REV. 345, 398 (2012) (arguing that “[s]ome of our most cherished constitutional decisions
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virtues of incremental change.163 The “frontier”-minded approach reflects a
different judgment about the utility and propriety of judicial leadership in
pursuit of social progress.164 These distinct normative priorities lead to
distinct theories of precedent: A constitutional lawyer who sympathizes with
the frontier-minded approach will be more inclined than a common law
constitutionalist to perceive bold judicial innovations as justifiable even
when they disrupt settled expectations and destabilize the political order.
Just as different strands of originalism can yield differing appraisals of
the importance of implementing the Constitution correctly, so, too, can the
various versions of living constitutionalism, or of any other interpretive
method. To be complete, a theory of constitutional precedent accordingly
must account for both interpretive method and the underlying premises that
inform it.
3. Alternative Approaches to Precedent.—In examining the interplay
between precedent, interpretive method, and normative commitments, I have
drawn on the schools of originalism and living constitutionalism. The reason
for that focus is the prominence of both philosophies in modern
constitutional discourse. Notwithstanding the selection of those two
examples, the necessity of examining precedent in methodological and
normative context reaches all approaches to constitutional interpretation. To
illustrate, consider one final example that does not fit neatly into the camps I
have discussed.
Lawrence Solum has sketched a “neoformalist” model in which
precedents exert binding force if they embody a formalistic process of
reasoning.165
From the neoformalist perspective, the most durable
constitutional mistakes—that is, those most worthy of being preserved on
grounds of stare decisis—are ones that result from a deliberative process
marked by attention to legal rules as sources of determinate meaning and
genuine constraint.166 The neoformalist approach flows from a basic
dedication to the function of law in providing a “public standard for the
resolution of disputes.”167 In addition to yielding consequentialist benefits
related to stability and the rule of law, the public-standard function is deemed

have come about precisely because judges decide—consciously—to cast aside their predecessors’
outmoded thinking, and place themselves on the constitutional frontier”).
163. See STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 85 (characterizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown
as an example of the “evolutionary, common law process” as opposed to “an isolated, pathbreaking
act”). But cf. Driver, supra note 162 (“Living constitutionalism, properly conceived, must create
significant leeway for judicial interpretations that deviate from even well-settled precedents.”).
164. See Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 755, 794 (2011).
165. Solum, supra note 4, at 186, 194.
166. See id. at 192–95.
167. Id. at 181; see also id. at 182 (noting that formalists “are keen on the plain meaning of
legal texts precisely because this methodology provides the best mechanism for making the law
accessible”).
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integral to protecting the rights of individuals to “have their dispute decided
in accordance with the existing law.”168
Embracing the neoformalist model of precedent is conditional upon
acceptance of these normative premises. For those who are inclined to
elevate other interests above judicial fidelity to public legal standards, the
neoformalist theory of precedent will be unpersuasive. It will fail to permit
overruling in cases where the value of rectifying a constitutional mistake is at
its apex—because, for example, the precedent departs from the
Constitution’s original meaning in a way that undermines popular
sovereignty,169 or because it violates widely-held beliefs regarding
fundamental rights and just treatment.170 The neoformalist position provides
yet another example of how working out a theory of constitutional precedent
requires a defined methodological apparatus for assigning value to the
consequences of constitutional mistakes.
IV. Constitutional Practice and the Problem of Pluralism
The previous Part contended that the modern doctrine of stare decisis is
fundamentally derivative. I claimed that for the doctrine to function, the
value of rectifying a mistaken precedent must be situated within an
interpretive and normative framework. This Part examines the implications
of those preconditions for constitutional practice at the U.S. Supreme Court.
I will suggest that the relationship between precedent and interpretive
method poses a serious problem for pluralistic approaches to adjudication
that resist adherence to any consistent theory of interpretation.
A.

The Primacy of Independent Effects

In applying the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme Court regularly
focuses on certain independent effects of precedential continuity, including
the disruption that is likely to result from an overruling and the degree to
which a precedent appears inconsistent with other lines of cases.171 Where
the independent costs of overruling are great, the dubious precedent is likely
to be retained.172 Where the independent effects are more equivocal,

168. Id. at 184.
169. See supra notes 153–60 and accompanying text.
170. See supra section III(B)(2).
171. For a discussion of the independent effects of precedential continuity, see supra Part II.
172. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443–44 (2000) (reaffirming Miranda
on grounds including the fact that the warnings it requires had “become part of our national
culture”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (reaffirming Roe in
part because “[a]n entire generation has come of age free to assume Roe’s concept of liberty in
defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to make reproductive decisions”); Quill Corp.
v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992) (reaffirming Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue,
386 U.S. 753 (1967), on grounds including the fact that its rule had “engendered substantial reliance
and ha[d] become part of the basic framework of a sizeable industry”).
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overruling becomes palatable.173 Under either scenario, the dependent value
of implementing a particular constitutional interpretation—and, at the same
time, replacing an inferior one—plays a limited role.
At first glance, this practice seems puzzling. The conception of stare
decisis as incorporating both the value of settlement and the value of
accuracy—recall Justice Brandeis’s classic dichotomy174—renders it
inadequate to fixate on the independent effects of precedential continuity
without also considering the direct, substantive consequences of perpetuating
a constitutional mistake. Surely it would matter to some Justices whether the
effect of a flawed precedent was, say, to validate the lawfulness of racial
segregation in public accommodations as opposed to limiting the authority of
states to impose tax-collection obligations on out-of-state retailers.175 The
importance of getting the law right can look very different from case to case
and judge to judge.
Yet there remains within the jurisprudence a notable lack of attention to
the substantive ramifications of interpretive accuracy. This phenomenon
extends to even the most high-profile applications of stare decisis. In Casey,
for example, the Court emphasized considerations of reliance and
institutional legitimacy as warranting the reaffirmance of Roe.176 Pursuant to
the Court’s own descriptions of the doctrine of stare decisis, its inquiry also
should have included a weighing of those considerations against the
substantive value of interpreting the Constitution correctly. On that latter
score, the Court said precious little.177 It made brief reference to the
“consequences” of abortion and the possibility that, “depending on one’s
beliefs,” the resulting harms may include the unjust termination of human
life.178 But it went no further, implying that because the costs of renouncing
Roe were significant, there was no need to dwell on the substantive impacts
of retaining the case.
It would be an overstatement to claim that the Court never mentions the
substantive effects of reaffirming erroneous precedents. To take a recent

173. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (“No serious reliance interests
are at stake.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (“[T]here has been no individual or
societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against overturning its holding once there
are compelling reasons to do so. Bowers itself causes uncertainty, for the precedents before and
after its issuance contradict its central holding.”); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)
(“Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and contract
rights, where reliance interests are involved; the opposite is true in cases such as the present one
involving procedural and evidentiary rules.” (citations omitted)).
174. See supra text accompanying note 8.
175. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), with Quill Corp., 504 U.S. 298.
176. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855–56, 861–69.
177. See Strauss, supra note 131, at 5 (“[T]he Court did not explain why mere [societal]
disagreement, even persistent disagreement, is enough to justify rejecting the position about fetal
life endorsed by a democratic majority.”).
178. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
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example, in Citizens United v. FEC179 the Court noted that a ban on
independent expenditures by corporations in support of political candidates
would impoverish the marketplace of ideas180 and validate the exercise of
governmental “censorship to control thought.”181 Other opinions likewise
reveal the Justices’ view that there is significant value in affording expressive
liberties the full protection they are due under the Constitution.182 These
sentiments can be glimpsed in areas such as the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unlawful searches.183 The Court has also noted the
potential consequences of overprotecting certain rights, as in its recognition
that application of the Miranda rules could result in the exclusion of
voluntary statements and allow “a guilty defendant [to] go free.”184 And in
the statutory context, the Court has acknowledged—without passing
judgment on—the argument that erroneous precedents are most in need of
overruling when they have proven “inconsistent with the sense of justice or
with the social welfare.”185
These statements suggest a role for the substantive value of accuracy
within the stare decisis calculus. Still, the Court’s treatment of that value
tends to be cursory and undeveloped. A tossed-off, abstract reference to the
ramifications of a given constitutional mistake—along the lines of “failing to
safeguard free speech is bad” or “protecting against unlawful searches is
good”—is no substitute for careful scrutiny of its severity. More is needed in
order to discharge the Court’s self-imposed obligation to consider both the
costs of upsetting the law and the importance of interpretive accuracy.

179. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
180. Id. at 364.
181. Id. at 356.
182. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 500 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (“This Court has not hesitated to overrule decisions
offensive to the First Amendment . . . .”).
183. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349 (2009) (“If it is clear that a practice is unlawful,
individuals’ interest in its discontinuance clearly outweighs any law enforcement ‘entitlement’ to its
persistence.”).
184. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000); see also, e.g., Gant, 556 U.S. at
349 (arguing that “[c]ountless individuals . . . have had their constitutional right to the security of
their private effects violated as a result” of a mistaken interpretation of the Fourth Amendment).
185. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989) (quoting Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 76, at
150) (internal quotation marks omitted)). David Shapiro recently offered a theory of constitutional
precedent that draws heavily on the Patterson language. See David L. Shapiro, The Role of
Precedent in Constitutional Adjudication: An Introspection, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 929, 944 (2008) (“I
would ask for a showing sufficient to persuade me that the precedent(s) constitute a significant
obstacle to the pursuit of other important, recognized objectives or the vindication of basic rights.”).
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Institutional Pluralism

Ours is not an originalist Supreme Court.186 To be sure, the Court often
refers to the Constitution’s original meaning in explaining its decisions, and
originalism occasionally takes center stage. A recent example comes from
District of Columbia v. Heller,187 in which the Court adopted a
predominantly originalist focus in determining whether the Second
Amendment recognizes an individual right to possess firearms.188 But at
other times, the Court resolves constitutional questions with little or no
attention to original meaning.189 Depending on the case, factors such as text,
history, precedent, justice, political philosophy, and government policy might
drive the analysis.190 The Court has not articulated an overarching theory to
explain the fluctuating relevance of the various considerations. Though there
is a predictable array of modalities of constitutional reasoning, their impact
on judicial opinions defies explanation by any single organizing principle.
This state of affairs might be taken to suggest that the Court’s
constitutional jurisprudence embraces the precepts of pragmatism. Some
leading advocates of pragmatism describe it as akin to an antitheory,
encompassing all potential sources of constitutional meaning without being
beholden to rigid rules of decision.191 The pragmatists’ benchmark is the
achievement of constitutional outcomes that yield the best “results for
society.”192 But as examples like Heller indicate, the Court sometimes
depicts social policy as subordinate or inapposite in resolving thorny
constitutional questions. That practice separates the Court’s approach from
genuine pragmatism, which acknowledges the potential importance of factors

186. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852
(1989) (“[O]riginalism is not, and had perhaps never been, the sole method of constitutional
exegesis.”).
187. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
188. See id. at 576 (“We turn first to the meaning of the Second Amendment.”); id. at 605
(describing the determination of “the public understanding of a legal text” as “a critical tool of
constitutional interpretation” (emphasis omitted)). But cf. id. at 625 (raising the possibility that
principles of stare decisis may “foreclose[]” the Court’s “adoption of the original understanding of
the Second Amendment”).
189. See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 33 (arguing that “original understandings play a role
only occasionally, and usually they are makeweights, or the Court admits that they are
inconclusive”); cf. Solum, supra note 4, at 170 (describing the Court’s attitude toward constitutional
text as “ambivalent”).
190. For influential treatments of the modalities of constitutional argumentation, see, for
example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987) and PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
191. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1331, 1332 (1988) (describing pragmatism as a means of “solving legal problems using every tool
that comes to hand, including precedent, tradition, legal text, and social policy”); Richard A. Posner,
Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1998) (“[W]hile in one sense pragmatism is
indeed a theory . . . , in an equally valid and more illuminating sense it is an avowal of skepticism
about various kinds of theorizing . . . .”).
192. Farber, supra note 191, at 1353.
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like “original intent” but does not allow them to become “decisive.”193 At
most, the Court’s constitutionalism is intermittently pragmatic, just as it is
intermittently originalist and intermittently living constitutionalist.
The best description of the Court’s interpretive approach is not
pragmatic but pluralistic.194 It is defined by the absence of any consistent
methodological commitment, including even a commitment to pragmatic
resolution of disputes.195 The Court emphasizes various interpretive
modalities from case to case—and often within the same case—without ever
suggesting “that the different methods are reducible to one master method,”
much less furnishing a passkey for undertaking such a decryption.196 That is
the essence of interpretive pluralism as I use the term here. Recognizing
multiple modalities of argument as relevant does not a pluralist make.197
Rather, pluralism arises from invoking those modalities without reference to
an overarching theory of interpretation designed to promote a specified set of
normative values.
The prevalence of pluralism owes in part to the Court’s composition of
different individuals appointed by different presidents and espousing
different judicial philosophies.198 The institutional dynamics of the Court as
a multimember body reduce the probability of methodological consensus. To
take just one example, Justice Thomas is especially attentive to the
Constitution’s original public meaning.199 His colleagues are, to varying
degrees, more inclined to reject originalist arguments in light of factors
including precedent and social policy. That sort of methodological diversity

193. Id.; cf. Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1, 8
(2011) (“[M]any pragmatists acknowledge constitutional language only because it serves as a focal
point, a convenient device that enables a diverse society to agree on what constitutes fundamental
law.”).
194. See, e.g., Coan, supra note 101, at 1063 (arguing that it is “virtually incontrovertible that
contemporary American constitutional practice has a substantially pluralist cast”).
195. See Sunstein, supra note 18, at 14 (“Not only has the Court as a whole refused to choose
among [interpretive theories] . . . , but many of the current justices have refused to do so in their
individual capacities.”); id. at 13 (“Even individual Supreme Court Justices can be hard to
classify.”); Coan, supra note 101, at 1063 (contending that the “defining characteristic [of
interpretive pluralism] is the recognition of multiple authoritative sources of constitutional
meaning”).
196. Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 1753,
1757 (1994).
197. See, for example, Richard Primus’s impressive effort at articulating a theory to explain
when original meanings should matter and when they should not: When Should Original Meanings
Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165 (2008).
198. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 827
(1982) (“[T]he Justices are not promoted from lower courts by a method that rewards conformity
with prevailing norms; to the contrary, Presidents often appoint particular Justices because they
value the new Justices’ different perspective on legal affairs.”).
199. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2751 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court’s decision today does not comport with the original public understanding of
the First Amendment.”); infra note 222.
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makes it less likely that five or more Justices will endorse originalism—or,
for that matter, any other unified theory of constitutional interpretation.200
C.

Individual Pluralism

As a practical matter, judicial decisions are not made by the Supreme
Court. They are made by the people who comprise it. A second layer of
interpretive pluralism emerges from the views of the Court’s individual
members. The validity of adjudicating constitutional disputes through
application of a “grand theory”201 continues to be a matter of extensive
debate. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson recently authored a notable book that
criticizes leading constitutional theories as “competing schools of liberal and
conservative judicial activism,”202 while Judge Richard Posner likewise has
expressed dissatisfaction with constitutional theory.203 And commentators
like Cass Sunstein advocate the resolution of constitutional disputes through
“incompletely theorized agreements” precisely to avoid disagreements over
“first principles.”204
Sympathy for these arguments reaches all the way to the Supreme
Court. The experience of John Roberts is a case in point. During his
confirmation hearings in 2005, soon-to-be-Chief Justice Roberts disavowed
allegiance to any single theory of constitutional law.205 He explained that
rather than drawing on abstract theory, he favors “bottom up” judging.206 As
he elaborated in a response to Senator Orrin Hatch:
If the phrase in the Constitution says two-thirds of the Senate,
everybody’s a literalist when they interpret that. Other phrases in the
Constitution are broader, [such as] “unreasonable searches and

200. See Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court
Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73, 87 n.47 (2003) (“[T]he principle of
‘every person for herself’ with respect to choosing interpretive practices is now well entrenched.”).
201. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1–4 (1988) (critiquing grand theory).
202. J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE
LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 4 (2012). For Judge Wilkinson, the
“highest virtues of judging” are found in overcoming theory and being guided instead by “selfdenial and restraint.” Id. at 116.
203. See generally Posner, supra note 191.
204. Sunstein, supra note 18, at 20–21; see also id. at 8 (“Courts should try to economize on
moral disagreement by refusing to challenge other people’s deeply held moral commitments when it
is not necessary for them to do so.”).
205. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 159 (2005)
[hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing] (“I have said I do not have an overarching judicial
philosophy that I bring to every case, and I think that’s true.”); GERHARDT, supra note 25, at 193
(“John Roberts avoided controversy by rejecting fidelity to any particular theory of constitutional
interpretation.”).
206. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 205, at 159; cf. GERHARDT, supra note 25, at
195 (describing Chief Justice Roberts as “signaling a preference to decide cases incrementally and
to infer principles from the records of the cases below”).
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seizures.” You can look at that wording all day and it’s not going to
give you much progress in deciding whether a particular search is
reasonable or not. You have to begin looking at the cases and the
precedents, what the Framers had in mind when they drafted that
provision.
So, yes, it does depend on the nature of the case before you[,] I
think.207
It is worth pausing to note that despite Chief Justice Roberts’s
protestations, his vision bears some hallmarks of a bona fide theory of
constitutional interpretation. The Constitution’s specific textual commands
must be interpreted literally. But when the Constitution sets forth broad
standards, respect for the document requires resort to other interpretive
techniques. On these points, the Chief Justice is in accord with theories such
as Jack Balkin’s “living originalism,” which embraces a similar distinction
between “determinate rule[s]” and broad standards.208
Despite these tendencies in the direction of grand theory, Chief Justice
Roberts established himself as a theory skeptic through his attitude toward
methodological consistency.209 The Chief Justice made no pretense of
consulting a unified principle to guide the weighing of relevant factors across
different types of cases. Constitutional text will control in some cases,
history in others, and precedent in still others.210 Determining which
modality should govern is done on a case-by-case basis. Therein lies the true
significance of the “bottom up” descriptor: It reflects the Chief Justice’s
dedication to interpretive pluralism.
The experience of Chief Justice Roberts demonstrates that the Court’s
pluralism is not solely the product of its multimember composition. It is also
the result of individual choice. Nor is the Chief Justice alone in his
pluralism. Five years after the Chief’s confirmation, Justice Kagan offered
her own endorsement of a “case-by-case” approach to interpretive method.211

207. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 205, at 158–59.
208. BALKIN, supra note 103, at 6 (“If the text states a determinate rule, we must apply the rule
because that is what the text offers us. If it states a standard, we must apply the standard. And if it
states a general principle, we must apply the principle.”). The affinity is highlighted by a separate
statement from the Chief Justice noting that although “the Framers’ intent is the guiding principle
that should apply,” judges must pay attention to whether the Framers “chose to use broader terms.”
Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 205, at 182; see also id. (“That is an originalist view
because you’re looking at the original intent as expressed in the words that they chose, and their
intent was to use broad language, not to use narrow language.”).
209. To be clear, I am not suggesting that the Chief Justice merely played the part of a theory
skeptic for purposes of securing confirmation. To the contrary, I assume (and believe) that he
candidly described his approach.
210. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 205, at 159; see id. at 182 (“So the approaches
do vary, and I don’t have an overarching view.”).
211. See The Nomination of Elena Kagan To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 81 (2010) (“I think
in general judges should look to a variety of sources when they interpret the Constitution, and which
take precedence in a particular case is really a kind of case-by-case thing.”).
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For case-by-case Justices, methodological diversity is an individual
phenomenon as much as an institutional one.212 Even if the Court were made
up of nine John Robertses or nine Elena Kagans, its interpretive method
would remain variable, sometimes proceeding in accordance with
philosophies such as originalism or living constitutionalism and sometimes
heading off in other directions.
D.

Theories of Precedent in Pluralism’s Wake

The preceding subparts have sought to establish a pair of related
propositions. First, in conducting its analyses of precedent, the Supreme
Court commonly fails to engage with the direct, substantive impact of
implementing the correct constitutional rule.213 Second, the interpretive
approach of both the Court as an institution and some of its individual
members is deeply pluralistic, eschewing any commitment to a consistent
constitutional method.214
Placing these propositions side by side suggests a solution to the puzzle
of why the independent effects of precedent dominate the Court’s stare
decisis jurisprudence. I have contended that integration of a definitive
interpretive method, as informed by an underlying set of normative premises,
is necessary to assess the value of rectifying a flawed precedent. If that claim
is correct, forsaking interpretive theory in favor of pluralism should foreclose
any inquiry into the importance of getting the law right. The interpretive
pluralist’s natural response would be to focus on independent effects such as
reliance expectations and workability, whose content does not depend on the
integration of interpretive method. And that is just what the Court tends to
do.215 While this reaction is understandable, it is unsatisfactory. By giving
short shrift to the substantive dimensions of constitutional accuracy, the
Court subverts its articulated doctrine of stare decisis.
So how is a Supreme Court Justice to proceed when she is confronted
by a constitutional precedent that she views as on point but problematic?
The most straightforward situation is that involving a Justice who is
committed to a defined interpretive philosophy. Such a philosophy furnishes
a metric for the Justice to utilize in appraising the severity of constitutional
errors. For example, Justice Breyer has advocated a paramount focus on
ensuring that fundamental constitutional values are borne out in practice.216
To him, the severity of a constitutional mistake depends on its pragmatic

212. See Sunstein, supra note 18, at 13−14 (noting that many Supreme Court Justices have not,
in their individual capacities, adhered to a single theory of constitutional interpretation).
213. See supra subpart IV(A).
214. See supra subparts IV(B)–(C).
215. See supra subpart IV(A).
216. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 75 (2010)
(“[T]he Court should regard the Constitution as containing unwavering values that must be applied
flexibly to ever-changing circumstances.”).
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effects. Thus, the primary reason for overruling a case like Plessy v.
Ferguson217 was that it “worked incalculable harm” and fell short of
promoting equal accommodations, let alone “equal[] respect[],” for people of
all races.218 Justice Breyer also emphasizes the need for a “thumb on the
scale in the direction of stability,”219 suggesting that constitutional mistakes
with less dire consequences than Plessy often will be innocuous enough to
tolerate. Justice Thomas, by comparison, commonly takes the position that
erroneous precedents should be reconsidered.220 His opinions provide some
reason to suspect that he views many or most deviations from the
Constitution’s original public meaning as, at most, only weakly
constraining.221
A trickier situation is the one exemplified by Justice Scalia’s
jurisprudence. Justice Scalia is not properly described as a bottom-up judge
in the style of Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Kagan. To the contrary, he
has taken great care in setting forth an overarching interpretive philosophy of
originalism that guides his constitutional decisions.222 At the same time,
Justice Scalia has conceded that he occasionally will depart from original
public meaning based on the presumptive benefits of preserving settled
law.223 The result is what he calls a “faint-hearted” version of originalism.224
217. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
218. BREYER, supra note 216, at 150; see also id. (“[M]uch of American society had begun to
see the Plessy decision as legally wrong and the segregated society it helped build as morally
wrong.”); id. at 150–51 (“[I]n Brown a unanimous Court overturned an earlier decision that the
justices considered legally wrong, out of step with society and the law, and unusually harmful.”).
219. Id. at 153.
220. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3063 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[S]tare decisis is only an ‘adjunct’ of our duty as judges to
decide by our best lights what the Constitution means.”); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410
(2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately to state my view that the standard set forth in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), is without basis in
the Constitution.”); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692–93 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“This case would be easy if the Court were willing to . . . return to the original meaning of the
[Establishment] Clause.”).
221. Cf. Vikram David Amar, Morse, School Speech, and Originalism, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
637, 647 (2009) (arguing that “Justice Thomas’s is an originalism that consumes everything else,
including stare decisis”); Tom Goldstein & Amy Howe, But How Will the People Know? Public
Opinion As a Meager Influence in Shaping Contemporary Supreme Court Decision Making, 109
MICH. L. REV. 963, 973–74 (2011) (“[Justice Thomas] now regularly dissents, urging the Court to
overrule prior lines of settled precedent. But those dissents are generally solo opinions, with no
other member of the Court willing to chart such significant new directions in the law.” (footnote
omitted)).
222. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 37–
41 (1997); see id. at 38 (“What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute:
the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”).
223. See id. at 140 (“[S]tare decisis is not part of my originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic
exception to it.”).
224. Scalia, supra note 186, at 864; see also SCALIA, supra note 222, at 138–39 (“Originalism,
like any other theory of interpretation put into practice in an ongoing system of law, must
accommodate the doctrine of stare decisis; it cannot remake the world anew.”); cf. BORK, supra
note 54, at 158 (“[I]t is too late to overrule not only the decision legalizing paper money but also

1884

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 91:1843

The faint-hearted approach has drawn criticism from some commentators for
lacking a coherent theoretical foundation: Jack Balkin contends that Justice
Scalia’s approach “undercuts the claim that legitimacy comes from adhering
to the original meaning of the text adopted by the [F]ramers,”225 and Randy
Barnett has gone so far as to argue that Justice Scalia is not properly
described as an originalist.226
As I have suggested with respect to popular-sovereigntist originalism
and consequentialist originalism, it is entirely possible for originalist theories
to permit the retention of flawed precedents in certain circumstances.227 The
sine qua non is the consultation of normative premises that provide a
principled basis for assessing the degree of harm threatened by the
perpetuation of a given constitutional mistake. The crucial question in
evaluating Justice Scalia’s treatment of precedent is whether he possesses a
defined normative baseline that can explain both (a) his general preference
for original meaning and (b) his view that the importance of correcting
constitutional mistakes must sometimes yield. If he does act with reference
to such a baseline, there is no inherent reason why his precedent-tolerating
approach to originalism is untenable.
Finally, we come to those who resist constitutional theory in favor of
interpretive pluralism.228 By disavowing any consistent interpretive method,
the pluralists find themselves at odds with the modern doctrine of stare
decisis. Without a theory for assessing the substantive dimensions of
constitutional errors, they lack the tools to appraise the value of
constitutional accuracy in any given case. The problem cannot be cured
through bottom-up judging that treats precedent as among an array of
relevant factors. Even on an eclectic approach to constitutional adjudication
in which multiple considerations are relevant to the treatment of precedent,
there must be some theory for determining how the considerations work
together and what happens when they diverge.229

those decisions validating certain New Deal and Great Society programs pursuant to the
congressional powers over commerce, taxation, and spending.”); Nelson Lund, Stare Decisis and
Originalism: Judicial Disengagement from the Supreme Court’s Errors, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1029, 1041 (2012) (arguing that “[a]lmost all originalists have decided, on pragmatic grounds, that
the Supreme Court’s constitutional infidelities must sometimes be allowed to mature into de facto
constitutional amendments”).
225. BALKIN, supra note 103, at 8–9.
226. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75
U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 24 (2006) (arguing that “Justice Scalia’s faint-hearted commitment to originalism
is not really originalism at all”).
227. See supra section III(B)(1).
228. See supra subpart IV(C).
229. See Paulsen, supra note 116, at 295 (“For any constitutional theory that acknowledges the
legitimacy of consideration of multiple and potentially inconsistent sources of constitutional
meaning there is an urgent corollary need for coherent and principled rules about what takes priority
and when one can repair to less-favored modalities to resolve unclarity.”); Adam M. Samaha, Low
Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 305, 317 (2010) (“The
constitutional pragmatist must choose goals before she can ‘do what works’ to achieve them, and a
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There is admittedly an element of, if not paradox, at least irony in the
conclusion that interpretive pluralism is an ill fit with the doctrine of
constitutional stare decisis. Strong deference to precedent might be seen as a
response to the very existence of methodological diversity, which increases
the probability that a given Justice will perceive certain precedents as
mistaken simply because she adheres to an interpretive method that differs
from that of her predecessors.230 The doctrine of stare decisis responds by
establishing a presumption of deference notwithstanding the proliferation of
varying interpretive methods.231 It thereby reduces the destabilizing effects
of methodological diversity among successive waves of Justices.232 Yet the
conflict between interpretive pluralism and constitutional precedent persists.
It may be true that deference to precedent is effective at preserving a stable
core within judicial systems characterized by methodological diversity.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that without reference to interpretive method,
a pluralist has no adequate basis for evaluating the costs of constitutional
mistakes.
The tension between the doctrine of stare decisis and pluralistic
approaches to interpretation does not extend to every manner in which
precedent is invoked. Precedent plays a variety of roles beyond institutional
self-binding that are left untouched by the failure to integrate constitutional
method. For example, the function of precedent as a means of hierarchical
control is not affected, nor is the use of precedent for purposes of
persuasion.233 Only when a Justice describes a precedent as genuinely
constraining—that is, as affecting the rule of decision in a subsequent case—
does the tension arise.
E.

Surveying the Potential Solutions

For the interpretive pluralist who wishes to pursue a workable theory of
constitutional precedent, at least three potential options are available:
uniform integration of interpretive method across cases; integration of
interpretive method on a context-dependent basis; and adoption of an
absolutist approach to precedent. A fourth option would require the
intervention of the Supreme Court as an institution: the Court could respond
common law constitutionalist must choose normative commitments if she will test tradition against
contemporary reason.”).
230. Cf. Fisch, supra note 36, at 100–01 (asserting that “[a] subsequent court’s disagreement
with a prior precedent is more likely to reflect a disagreement about the prior court’s selection of
decisional principles than the application of those principles”).
231. For exploration of this point, see Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential
Disagreement, 91 TEXAS L. REV.1711 (2013).
232. For a comparable suggestion in the context of statutory stare decisis, see CBOCS West,
Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008) (“Principles of stare decisis . . . demand respect for
precedent whether judicial methods of interpretation change or stay the same. Were that not so,
those principles would fail to achieve the legal stability that they seek and upon which the rule of
law depends.”).
233. See supra Part I.
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to the challenges created by interpretive pluralism by redesigning the
doctrine of stare decisis to exclude the dependent, substantive dimensions of
constitutional accuracy. Finally, there is the possibility that any dissonance
could be overcome through judicial courtesy and compromise. I discuss each
of these options in turn, though my analysis is admittedly tentative and
preliminary; a full vetting of these options (and, perhaps, others) must be left
for future work.
1. Uniform Integration.—The clearest solution for the pluralist Justice
who is grappling with constitutional precedent is to undertake the project of
constructing a consistent, overarching theory of constitutional interpretation.
With such a theory in place, there would be a ready mechanism for assessing
the costs of constitutional mistakes. A Justice who devoted herself to a
particular interpretive strategy, guided by defined normative premises, would
be well-positioned to fashion an accompanying theory of precedent. Of
course, she would also cease to be an interpretive pluralist.
2. Context-Dependent Integration.—Rather than restyling herself as an
adherent of one interpretive school or another, our pluralist Justice could
articulate a context-dependent set of interpretive methodologies. For
instance, originalism might provide the appropriate lens in interpreting the
Second Amendment’s right to bear arms.234 In other areas, perhaps including
application of the Free Speech Clause, originalism might give way to
methodologies such as living constitutionalism or pragmatism.235 Within
each context, the Justice would also articulate a normative justification for
her approach, from structuralism or consequentialism in the originalist
domains to common law adjudication or judicial innovation in the domains
of living constitutionalism.236
The context-dependent approach would not result in any uniform
methodological election. Within the contours of a given dispute, however, it
would yield an effective apparatus for assigning value to the correction of
constitutional mistakes. In a category of cases where structural originalism
provided the rule of decision, all constitutional errors would be deemed
intolerable; the value of accuracy would trump.237 By comparison, in
categories where common law constitutionalism reigned supreme, the
relevant costs of retaining a flawed precedent would include considerations
of justice and social policy.238

234. Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008) (emphasizing the “original
understanding of the Second Amendment”).
235. See STRAUSS, supra note 1, at 52–53 (describing the nonoriginalist complexion of the
Court’s free speech jurisprudence).
236. See supra subpart III(B).
237. See supra notes 115–21 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text.
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The central distinction between the context-dependent approach and
pure pluralism is the former’s commitment to the consistent utilization of
predefined methodologies within particular substantive contexts.
By
furnishing a set of metrics for gauging the intensity of constitutional
mistakes, the context-dependent approach addresses the tension between
pluralism and the doctrine of stare decisis. But its success comes at a price—
and one that brings the broader vulnerabilities of interpretive pluralism into
relief. The context-dependent model contemplates that in some situations,
factors such as policy outcomes will be integral to the severity of a
constitutional error. In other situations, policy outcomes will be secondary or
inapposite. Likewise, a precedent’s harmfulness might occasionally be
determined by its compatibility with principles of popular sovereignty or
supermajoritarian consensus, while in other cases those considerations would
have no role to play.
The implications are not different in kind from the implications of
interpretive pluralism more generally. After all, pluralism contemplates
judicial responsiveness to different indicia of constitutional meaning from
case to case and context to context.239 Yet viewing these consequences
through the prism of precedent makes the ramifications of pluralism more
vivid. The doctrine of stare decisis seeks to promote and accommodate
systemic interests in (among other values) stability, rationality, and the rule
of law.240 Uncertainty about the criteria for evaluating the respective
harmfulness of various constitutional mistakes is at odds with those norms.
By this I do not mean to suggest that interpretive pluralism is unprincipled.
A pluralist judge could be perfectly consistent in her process of adjudication,
always making sure to consult a defined set of relevant sources before
reaching her decision. That approach, it seems to me, might well satisfy the
demand for consistency that we properly make upon our judges.241
Nevertheless, consistent processes are insufficient to give content to the
value of getting the law right in a way that is amenable to the application of
stare decisis across cases. The doctrine of stare decisis requires something
more.
3. Absolutism.—If our hypothetical Supreme Court Justice is not
prepared to rethink pluralism as her preferred approach to constitutional
239. See supra subparts IV(B)–(C).
240. See supra Part II.
241. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How To Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV.
535, 573 (1999) (declaring that “[f]or a judge or Justice to appeal to inconsistent assumptions [about
preferred methods of reasoning] from one case to the next would breed cynicism” because “[t]he
ideal of judicial reason, as distinct from power or will, implies an obligation of methodological
integrity”); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1767–68 (2010) (contending in
the context of statutory interpretation that “[l]itigants bringing like claims expect to have their cases
decided under the same legal standards, and methodological flip-flopping undermines the public
perception of the Court as a neutral body”).
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interpretation, she might consider tailoring her view of precedent. The
objective would be to avoid any need for assessing the substantive value of
replacing incorrect constitutional rules. There are two ways in which that
objective might be pursued.
Our Justice might resolve, following the example of the pre-1966 House
of Lords,242 that from this day forward she will cease to vote for the
overruling of any constitutional precedent. Instead, she will leave the
correction of constitutional errors entirely to the Article V amendment
process.243 The Justice would still need to grapple with issues of precedential
scope in determining whether a prior decision was, in fact, controlling. But
she would be spared the task of making case-by-case determinations about
the comparative value of leaving the law settled versus getting the law right.
Relinquishing the judicial power to overrule is strong medicine. So,
too, is the pluralistic Justice’s second potential option, which is the converse
of the first: The Justice could disavow any discretion to reaffirm a
constitutional precedent that she views as incorrect. In effect, constitutional
stare decisis would be excised from her jurisprudence. All constitutional
questions would be resolved without any effort to maintain continuity with
Justices of the past through the preservation of precedent.
4. Doctrinal Redesign.—Both absolute deference and zero deference
would represent rather severe responses to the tension between pluralism and
the doctrine of stare decisis. That severity is not disqualifying, but it does
reduce the appeal and practicality of those options. It is thus worth
considering whether the Supreme Court could find a more palatable solution
through some other means. Is there an alternative formulation of stare
decisis that is, if not perfect, at least a better fit with the second-best world of
interpretive pluralism?
The Court might, for example, recast the doctrine of stare decisis as
entirely dependent on the disruptive impact of adjudicative change, such that
an erroneous precedent would be retained if and only if the disruption likely
to accompany its overruling exceeds some predefined threshold. This
version of stare decisis could be applied without any integration of
interpretive method. Upon concluding that a precedent was mistaken, the
Justices would have no need for aligning themselves with interpretive
schools like originalism or living constitutionalism. They would simply
consider the disruptiveness of reversing course.
In lieu of this disruption-based approach, the Court could address the
tension between pluralism and precedent by redesigning the doctrine of stare
decisis to focus on other independent effects of precedential continuity, such

242. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
243. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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as jurisprudential coherence or workability.244 The common denominator is
disregard for the substantive value of correct interpretation. The direct
benefits of replacing a mistaken rule would play no role in the stare decisis
analysis. The moment those benefits reentered the fold, the tension between
stare decisis and pluralism would return along with them.
The central problem with proposals like these is that the redesigned
doctrine of stare decisis would itself be inconsistent with certain interpretive
methodologies. For example, a doctrine based exclusively on disruptiveness
would imply both that disruptiveness is a legitimate reason for retaining a
precedent and that all other considerations are inapposite.245 Much the same
would be true if other independent factors were added to or substituted for
disruptiveness. The question is whether a doctrine of stare decisis
reconstituted along these lines would fare any better than existing law in
dealing with interpretive pluralism. If the answer is yes, the explanation
would seem to be that it is more justifiable to ask judges to stipulate to the
relevance of independent considerations like disruptiveness—even at the
expense of applying their preferred interpretive theories—than to seek
agreement about the direct, substantive ramifications of a particular
constitutional ruling. Evaluating the soundness of such an explanation is a
matter that requires further analysis.
5. Judicial Compromise.—Finally, it is worth considering whether the
dissonance between pluralism and stare decisis might be worked out through
the mechanism of judicial compromise, without the need for any doctrinal
revision. Different Supreme Court Justices may harbor different views as to
what makes an erroneous precedent so harmful as to warrant overruling. But
they could seek to come together around their common ground—for
example, by agreeing that a precedent should be retained, even if they
disagree about the reason why. Those Justices could compromise to produce
an opinion that is “shallow” enough to be agreeable to all of them.246
Alternatively, they might agree to join an opinion that reaches the correct
result even if they have quibbles over the way in which the issue of stare
decisis is handled.
I see the virtues of both approaches, and I suspect that they occur with
some regularity in practice. Yet they provide an incomplete solution to the
problem of pluralism. Crafting shallow opinions will tend to reduce the
institutional pluralism that arises from different Justices’ adherence to
different methodologies.247 But it does so at the expense of analytical

244. See supra Part II.
245. See supra section II(A)(1).
246. See Sunstein, supra note 18, at 21 (defending the use of shallow decisions that “make it
possible for people to agree when agreement is necessary” while “mak[ing] it unnecessary for
people to agree when agreement is impossible”).
247. See supra subpart IV(B).
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exposition, which is a trade-off that should give us some pause. Moreover,
shallow opinion writing does not solve the problem of individual pluralism.
Before she engages the question of whether to compromise, a jurist must
determine, in her own mind, what the proper metric is for assessing the value
of getting the law right.248 Until she undertakes that analysis, shallow
opinions will merely paper over a missing analytical step.
F.

A Dose of Realism?

Might it be that the integration of interpretive method with
constitutional precedent is already occurring, sub rosa, or perhaps even
subconsciously, in the Supreme Court’s decisions?
The Justices conceivably may be conducting in-depth examinations of
the value of interpretive accuracy based on their respective philosophical
predispositions and normative premises, but then refraining from weaving
those examinations into their written opinions. This prospect seems unlikely,
as there is no apparent explanation for why the Justices would be inclined to
obscure that type of analysis from public view while providing elaborate
explanations of their other interpretive moves.
An alternative theory is more plausible. It posits that when the Justices
confront dubious precedents, they draw on basic, vaguely formed intuitions
regarding the relative severity of constitutional mistakes. When a Justice
declares that she is willing to stand by a precedent for the sake of stare
decisis, she is implying that the costs of perpetuating the constitutional
mistake are below some internal threshold, even if she does not have a
developed theory of interpretation in mind.
It is impossible to know how often this latter scenario reflects the
Court’s actual practice, and we can stipulate to its potential occurrence
without meaningfully affecting the analysis presented in this Article. For a
Justice whose instincts suggest that a given type of constitutional error is
especially harmful, a principled theory of precedent requires unpacking that
intuition to test its consistency with the Justice’s broader interpretive
approach. As we have seen, some approaches to assessing constitutional
mistakes are, while superficially plausible, irreconcilable with certain
interpretive methods.249
The Justice who views one constitutional mistake as more harmful than
another must explain which normative premises justify her view and whether
those premises are consistent with her interpretive method. In the event of an
inconsistency, it is incumbent upon the Justice either to overcome her initial
intuitions of harmfulness or to adjust her broader theory of constitutional

248. See supra subpart IV(D).
249. See supra Part III.
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interpretation to take them into account.250 In light of the Court’s laudable
commitment to reason giving,251 the appropriate forum for that deliberative
process is a written opinion, not the Justice’s own mind.252
This Article’s prescriptions accordingly remain applicable even if one
believes that the Justices already engage in rudimentary and implicit analyses
of the severity of constitutional mistakes. Neither rudimentary nor implicit is
sufficient.
V.

Objections and Analogies

So far I have contended that theories of precedent require the integration
of particular interpretive methodologies as informed by underlying normative
premises. The following subparts consider two potential reactions to my
argument, one in the spirit of objection and one in the spirit of analogy. The
objection is that the benefits of integrating precedent and interpretive method
are rendered illusory by the tendency of stare decisis to corrupt any
interpretive strategy to which it is joined. The analogy suggests that the
relationship between precedent and interpretive method extends beyond the
realm of constitutional law.
A.

Intrinsic Corruption

Aspiration toward interpretive accuracy arguably sits in tension with the
doctrine of stare decisis, which can lead to the perpetuation of constitutional
rulings that would be rejected in the absence of applicable precedent. Some
commentators have seized upon this tension to argue that deference to
precedent undermines the purity of any constitutional theory. The most wellknown critique is that of Justice Scalia, who has called stare decisis a
“compromise of all philosophies of interpretation.”253 Michael Paulsen
echoes that conclusion in contending that deference to erroneous decisions is
“intrinsically corrupting” of constitutional theory because it “accords

250. Cf. Strang, supra note 160, at 1730 (“[P]recedent plays such a central role in our legal
practice that all plausible interpretative methodologies must account for the role of precedent in
their theories.”).
251. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 54, at 2016 (“[A] good opinion contains the true reasons that
led to the judge’s decision. The decision must be reasoned. It must be principled. It must be
transparent.”).
252. Cf. Gerhardt, supra note 1, at 143 (“There can be no meaningful exchange of ideas among
the Justices on the question of continued adherence to precedent unless they each disclose their
reasons for the positions they have taken and the values they believe should continue to guide the
Court’s decisionmaking on the particular issue under reconsideration.”).
253. SCALIA, supra note 222, at 139; see also id. (“The whole function of the doctrine is to
make us say that what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the
interest of stability.”). For a recent reaffirmation, see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 51, at 414
(“[Stare decisis] is an exception to textualism (as it is to any theory of interpretation) born not of
logic but of necessity.”).
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decision-altering force to precedents that would otherwise be thought
wrong.”254
Despite its capacious formulation, the intrinsic-corruption thesis is
ultimately an adjunct of structural originalism255 that does not necessarily
apply to other methodologies. Even when legal change is desirable, it is by
nature disruptive. The world in which a given precedent exists is different
from the world in the absence of any such precedent. The issuance of a
judicial opinion carries meaningful consequences for the way in which
individuals organize their affairs, legislators craft laws, and society at large
understands the content and nature of the legal backdrop.256 It is possible to
conclude, following the structural originalists, that those consequences
should be irrelevant to the task of constitutional interpretation.257 It is also
plausible to argue that the ramifications of a precedent’s issuance are
germane to the propriety of its retention. Interpretive philosophies that
permit deference to precedent in order to mediate the costs of legal change
are subject to reasonable dispute regarding their functionality and their
fidelity to the Constitution, but they are not corrupted by their acceptance of
stare decisis.258
In staking out the contrary view, Professor Paulsen acknowledges the
argument that precedent might legitimately be deployed as one component of
an overarching constitutional theory.259 He remains unconvinced, criticizing
such theories as implying that judicial pronouncements can alter the
Constitution’s meaning.260 Professor Paulsen’s criticism is elegant and
thought-provoking, but I submit that it is ultimately unpersuasive in two
respects. First, as suggested in the previous paragraph, there is no innate
reason why a theory of constitutional interpretation must disregard the effects
of deviating from precedents that are already on the books. A constitutional
theory that is driven by factors such as policy considerations or welfare
maximization can easily accommodate the view that, for example, the
original public meaning of the Constitution’s text should govern unless the
negative effects of breaking continuity exceed some threshold. Those types
of approaches provide ample room for principles of stare decisis to operate.

254. Paulsen, supra note 116, at 290–91; see also Lawson, supra note 32, at 32 (describing
deference to erroneous constitutional precedents as inconsistent with “any theory of interpretation
that prescribes objective right answers to constitutional questions” (footnote omitted)).
255. See supra section III(A)(1).
256. See Kozel, supra note 59.
257. See supra section III(A)(1).
258. Cf. Caminker, supra note 26, at 859 (“[A] court may appropriately interpret a particular
constitutional provision to take into account the institutional values that commend embracing the
same interpretation offered previously by (the same or) a superior court.”).
259. Paulsen, supra note 116, at 292.
260. See id. at 294–95 (challenging the argument that “judges have the power to invest the
Constitution with meaning simply by virtue of their decisions and opinions”).
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Second, even someone who views original meaning as the paramount
source of constitutional law might accept deference to precedent as a
legitimate part of the judicial process through which that meaning is brought
to bear. When the Supreme Court confronts a precedent it currently views as
erroneous, it is dragged into conflict with its past self. The institutional
question is which instantiation of the Court—the prior one or the current
one—should win out in issuing the decree of the “judicial department”
created under Article III.261 A Justice or constitutional lawyer might
plausibly conclude that fidelity to the Constitution is not impaired by
resolving such disputes with a presumption in favor of the predecessor Court,
any more than fidelity to the Constitution requires lower courts to ignore
Supreme Court decisions they view as erroneous. The debate is not about the
proper source of constitutional meaning but “the institutional mechanism”
through which disputes over that meaning “are to be settled.”262 A
presumption in favor of the current Court’s interpretation represents an
internally coherent approach to constitutional adjudication. So, too, does the
opposite presumption in favor of precedent.
The force of the intrinsic-corruption thesis turns out to be coextensive
with structural originalism, which draws on the Constitution’s status as
supreme law in renouncing departures from original meaning.263 Given the
theory’s premises, it would be discordant for a structural originalist to
contemplate the privileging of judicial precedent over original meaning. For
those who claim no allegiance to structural originalism—including
originalists who base their interpretive approach on other normative
premises264—precedent remains a potentially legitimate component of
constitutional method. Correct or incorrect, their theories are not necessarily
corrupt.
B.

Statutory and Common Law Precedents

Stare decisis applies to more than constitutional cases. The Supreme
Court has stamped its statutory decisions with a degree of durability beyond
that which is accorded to constitutional rulings.265 The divergence is

261. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995) (noting that Article III
creates “not a batch of unconnected courts, but a judicial department composed of ‘inferior Courts’
and ‘one supreme Court’”).
262. See Solum, supra note 4, at 196 (“Once we are operating within the realm of formalist
precedents, the question is not ‘Are we respecting the authority of the Constitution?’ but is instead,
‘What is the institutional mechanism by which disputes about the meaning of the Constitution are to
be settled?’”); see also Larry Alexander, Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139, 144 (2010)
(“Originalists qua originalists have no position on the allocation of legal authority in any particular
legal system.”); Caminker, supra note 26, at 858 (“The entire federal judiciary could just as
plausibly be the appropriate autonomous interpretive unit.”).
263. See supra section III(A)(1).
264. See supra section III(B)(1).
265. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989)
(“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation . . . .”).
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commonly explained by a pair of institutional assumptions: The challenges
inherent in the Article V amendment process warrant a more active role for
the judiciary in reconsidering constitutional precedents; and Congress’s
failure to amend a statute in response to a judicial construction is a form of
implicit acquiescence.266 Both claims are susceptible to challenge. There are
credible explanations other than acquiescence—from the limited capacity of
the legislative agenda to the touchy politics of removing an entitlement that
was previously endorsed by the judiciary—that might explain the
legislature’s failure to amend a statute.267 Nor is it obvious why, if inaction
really were tantamount to approval, acquiescence by the sitting Congress
should be sufficient to ratify the judicial interpretation of a statute that was
passed by an earlier Congress.268 Further, the unique status of the
Constitution as a “framework for government” arguably counsels in favor of
greater, not lesser, solicitude for continuity in the constitutional realm,
suggesting that the difficulty of formal amendment is a virtue to be preserved
as opposed to a miscalculation that warrants a doctrinal end around.269
Putting aside the debatable wisdom of according enhanced deference to
statutory precedents,270 the question of immediate concern is how such
deference should be understood within the analytical framework I have tried
to develop. In particular, given the proliferation of competing schools of
statutory interpretation such as textualism and purposivism,271 it might be
thought to follow that the integration of interpretive method and precedent is
equally necessary in the statutory context as in the constitutional context.

There are recognized exceptions for statutes that imply a delegation of lawmaking authority. See
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (“Stare decisis is not
as significant in this case . . . because the issue before us is the scope of the Sherman Act. From the
beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common law statute.” (citation omitted)).
266. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172–73 (observing that in the context of statutory interpretation,
“unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and
Congress remains free to alter what we have done”); Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in
the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 317, 322–24 (2005) (summarizing the conventional
arguments in favor of strong statutory stare decisis).
267. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1403–08
(1988) (challenging the argument regarding legislative acquiescence).
268. Barrett, supra note 266, at 336–37; Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The
Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 193–95 (1989).
269. Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
422, 431 (1988) (“Precisely because constitutional rules establish governmental structures, because
they are the framework for all political interactions, it ought to be harder to revise them than to
change statutory rules. The reasons for making amendment hard apply as well to overrulings.”);
Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1180 (2006)
(“One purpose of having a written constitution is to create a stable framework for government. . . .
Overruling [bedrock] doctrines would create just the kind of uncertainty and instability that
constitutions (even more than other laws) are designed to avoid . . . .”).
270. For further analysis, see generally Eskridge, supra note 267.
271. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 241, at 1762–64 (contrasting textualist and purposivist
approaches to statutory interpretation).
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The existence of varying philosophies for interpreting statutes does not
end the inquiry. In constitutional cases, the need for integrating interpretive
method arises from the existence of multiple superficially plausible272
approaches for defining the nature of substantive harm that results from a
mistaken interpretation. Depending on one’s philosophy, the relevant impact
of retaining an erroneous rule might be characterized in terms of social
welfare, justice, popular sovereignty, or beyond.273 Without an integration of
interpretive method, there is no metric for assessing the value of replacing an
incorrect rule with a correct one.
Whether the integration of interpretive method is also a precondition to
the application of stare decisis in the statutory context depends on whether
there is similar room for debate in defining the ramifications of misconstrued
statutes. Are there a variety of plausible metrics for assessing the value of a
correct statutory interpretation? If so, the integration of interpretive method
is required in order to facilitate the application of stare decisis. For example,
it may be that the severity of a statutory mistake should be viewed in terms of
the extent to which the judicial construction deviated from the legislature’s
intentions. Or perhaps the importance of correcting a statutory error should
turn on whether the judicial construction has proven “inconsistent with the
sense of justice or with the social welfare.”274 Assuming that these (or other)
approaches to valuing statutory accuracy can be plausibly maintained, the
integration of interpretive method would be necessary to facilitate the
principled treatment of precedent. That assumption appears sound as a
preliminary matter, but it would require further scrutiny before the
requirement of integrating a particular interpretive philosophy could be
convincingly established.
Much the same is true of the application of this Article’s analysis to the
treatment of precedent in common law cases. Common law adjudication can
lead to the formation of “established doctrines and principles.”275 When the
question inevitably arises as to whether a court should break from such a
doctrine or principle, there must be some theory for evaluating how harmful
it would be to let matters stand. That brings us once again to the issue of
how to infuse the concept of harm with legal salience. Is it about economic
inefficiency, moral injustice, dubious public policy, or other considerations?
The answer to that question, which depends on one’s normative theory of
what the common law is driving at, will inform the choice between retaining
and overturning flawed precedents.

272. As noted earlier, debating about which of these approaches is best is not the type of project
I am undertaking here.
273. See supra Part III.
274. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989) (quoting Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting CARDOZO, supra note 76, at
150) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
275. Waldron, supra note 67, at 7.
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Conclusion
Contending that a theory of precedent compels a particular result of its
own volition runs into a problem of infinite regress, calling to mind Stephen
Hawking’s anecdote about “turtles all the way down.”276 Certain factors that
are relevant to the choice between retaining and overruling a flawed
precedent are amenable to preliminary scrutiny in isolation from interpretive
method.277 But the doctrine of stare decisis is founded on the premise that
the value of leaving the law settled must ultimately be weighed against the
value of getting the law right.278 Negotiating that tension, I have argued,
requires the integration of interpretive methodology as informed by
underlying normative premises. In the absence of such integration, there is
no suitable mechanism for defining the value of constitutional accuracy
across cases.

276. STEPHEN W. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 1 (1988).
277. See supra Part II.
278. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.

